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	 In August, 2017, the Indian Supreme Court ruled on a landmark case involving one 
Shayara Bano and four petitioners that instant triple talaq, a unique and controversial 
variation of  an Islamic method for declaring divorce, was incompatible with the Indian 
constitution due to its detrimental effects on Muslim women and its lack of  centrality to the 
religion. Many news and media sources both in India and around the world were quick to 
report this as a straightforward victory for Muslim women, while the male-dominated Islamic 
scholarly community expressed disdain at the least and outrage at the most. However, the 
matter is far more complicated and requires an understanding of  history, social structure and 
political ideologies in India. 
	 The first portion of  this paper analyzes the history of  State intervention in Muslim 
personal law from the colonial period onward in an effort to contextualize and critique the 
current government’s actions. It then analyzes and compares the tactics and positions of  four 
Muslim women’s activist groups and the one male-dominated group at the forefront of  public 
discourse on instant triple talaq, as well as their responses to the Supreme Court judgement 
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s subsequent executive order to criminalize the practice. 
Ultimately, the paper aims to answer the following question: What do these groups 
approaches to activism and stances on instant triple talaq convey about the current state of  
gender politics in Islamic institutions in India? In the process of  providing an answer, the 
paper also addresses issues such as the relationship between the State and religious minorities, 
the competing loyalties that face Muslim women, and the inevitable consequences of  inviting 
a Hindu nationalist regime to intervene in a prolonged conflict between Muslim women and 
the patriarchal forces behind the Islamic institutions. 
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Introduction 
	 On August 25th, 2017 I was sinking into a stiff  airplane seat, sighing with the deepest 
feeling of  relief  as I’d just managed to catch the absolute last flight leaving the city of  
Houston for the next four days. I had raced through the beginning of  what would soon be 
known as the most disastrous hurricane to ever strike the city so that I could make it to Delhi 
in time to meet my professor and other classmates. Truly, it was the most dramatic attempt to 
catch a flight I’d ever been through. The second I clicked my seatbelt in that god-awful 
middle seat on the plane my phone buzzed in my back pocket—and buzzed, and buzzed. 
Scrambling to check my notifications I found layers of  headlines that read something like 
“Victory for Muslim women: “Indian Supreme Court bans triple talaq” or, “India bans 
Islamic form of  divorce.” It was in this serendipitous moment that I realized what the topic of  
my undergraduate thesis would be. 
	 Interestingly, after my first few months in Lucknow I realized that so many of  the 
Muslim men and women of  different classes that I came to know were hardly concerned 
about instant triple talaq (a more proper way of  referring to the practice), but rather they were 
concerned about the context in which the Supreme Court decision and consequential 
legislation were made. In the years since Narendra Modi, leader of  the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), became Prime Minister, the practice of  instant triple talaq has become extremely 
politicized, drawing attention from news sources all over the world. Of  course, that is not to 
say that there was not a significant effort coming from Muslim women to have the practice 
banned, but as I will discuss later, their approaches to activism were quite splintered.  
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	 In 2017, when the Supreme Court decided that the practice of  instant triple talaq 
should be banned, tensions between Hindus and Muslims were at a high due primarily to the 
strengthening of  the nationalist Hindutva movement fostered by the BJP’s rise in popularity 
from the late 1980's, which has driven an increase in heinous acts of  violence and 
discrimination targeted at Muslim communities. Muslims were, and still are, dramatically 
underrepresented in governing bodies at the State and national level, especially within the 
BJP. In 2014, when the BJP took over Parliament and Modi became PM, the party had 
backed only 7 Muslims out of  482 MP candidates, none of  whom were elected, and Muslim 
representation in Parliament dropped to a mere 4%—the lowest in nearly 60 years.  In the 1
2017 Assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP), the country’s most populated state, Muslims 
accounted for 19.2% of  the population, about 43 million people or the size of  Argentina.  2
Yet they were represented by only 5.9% of  the UP Assembly where the BJP took 312 of  403 
seats without backing a single Muslim candidate. Nationwide, Muslims accounted for 14.2% 
of  the population, yet only 0.28% of  the Members of  the Legislative Assembly (four out of  
1418) were Muslim.  To further contextualize this, the 2011 Indian census reported that 3
Muslims make up more than 172 million of  India’s then 1.2 billion population, making it the 
third largest Muslim population in the world, and a large minority in the country.   4
 Mannathukkaren, Nissim. "The Fast Disappearing Muslim in the Indian Republic." The Indian 1
Express. January 22, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/the-fast-disappearing-muslim-
in-the-indian-republic-bjp-mla-hindu-saffron-religion-5034205/.
 Mannathukkaren, Nissim. "The Fast Disappearing Muslim in the Indian Republic" 2
 Mannathukkaren, Nissim. "The Fast Disappearing Muslim in the Indian Republic" 3
 "Religion Census 2011." Religion Data - Population of  Hindu / Muslim / Sikh / Christian - Census 4
2011 India. https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php.
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	 Given this data, it is important to note that it was shortly after the rise of  Modi and 
the BJP that instant triple talaq became an important political issue, rather than a topic of  
controversy that was mostly confined to internal discourse of  the Muslim community. There 
had long been individuals or organizations that stood against the practice, especially from 
within the Muslim community, but it was rather uncommon to find this at the center of  
debates on prime time news, or as at the center of  prominent political and activist campaigns. 
There had been films such as B.R. Chopra’s Nikaah in 1986 and the infamous Shah Bano 
controversy in the mid-80’s, which drew attention to the contention between personal and 
State laws, causing a similar discord among Muslim activists. The issue of  Muslim personal 
law, specifically family law, conflicting with State laws had been an important topic of  public 
debate since the colonial period with landmark Supreme Court decisions and legislation that 
affected maintenance laws and other matters related to divorce. However, the politicizing of  
instant triple talaq is unique largely due to the context in which the Supreme Court ruled to 
ban the practice, and later legislation criminalized it in the face of  a diverse array of  female 
Muslim activist groups and male-dominated organizations. Among these entities are the All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB), the All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law 
Board (AIMWPLB), Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (hereon after referred to as Jamaat), Bazm-e-
Khavateen, and the Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA). As each of  these 
organizations have played key roles in either the history of  debates over the adjudication of  
Muslim personal law in India and/or have recently become central to the debates over 
instant triple talaq, their ideologies and approaches to activism will be analyzed and discussed 
in this paper. 
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	 Thus, the focus of  this paper will not be the content of  the legislation or an analysis 
of  the practice of  triple talaq as one might expect. Instead, this paper will take an analytical 
approach to the public statements and activism of  the prominent Muslim-led organizations at 
the center of  the debates concerning the practice. Ultimately, this is an inquiry to the 
question: What do these five groups’ methods of  activism convey about the gender politics in 
the Indian Muslim community today?  
	 In order to properly address the question, the paper has been divided into three 
chapters. The first is an assessment of  the history of  the controversies and landmark 
legislation and Supreme Court cases regarding the adjudication of  Muslim personal law 
beginning with the colonial period, preceded by a brief  explanation of  what Muslim personal 
law, or the Shariat, is and how it has operated in India. This chapter will also include a short, 
although crucial, depiction of  the humanitarian conflicts that Indian Muslims have been 
facing in the last twenty years. This is crucial to understanding the controversy surrounding 
instant triple talaq and the socio-political environment of  India today. The second chapter will 
further analyze the aforementioned key figures’ ideologies and approaches to activism noting 
any shifts over time. In the third chapter I will provide a timeline of  the published work and 
statements from the five organizations’ campaigns leading up to the 2017 Supreme Court 
decision, accompanied by a more comprehensive analysis of  each group’s arguments for or 
against the practice itself  and the government’s involvement. Lastly, this chapter will discuss 
the crucial pieces of  legislation that succeeded the 2017 landmark decision. A significant 
portion of  the primary sources for the research comes from broadcasted interviews, speeches, 
press releases and online news articles and op-ed’s, some of  which were originally in Urdu or 
Hindustani of  which the quotes cited were translated by me. These primary sources will 
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range from the era of  the Shah Bano case of  1985, then skip to more immediately relevant 
publications from 2014 onward, to present day. The primary texts will serve as indications 
and implications of  any shifts in ideologies or public opinion within the main organizations.  
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Religion and the State 
	 Commonly known as the largest democracy in the world, India is a vastly diverse 
nation rich in histories, cultures, religions, traditions and mythologies that have clashed, 
coexisted and contradicted one another across hundreds of  empires and dynasties that have 
thrived and perished. Today it is considered the largest democracy in world; a democratic 
nation that is comprised of  twenty-nine states, seven union territories, twenty-two major 
languages, thirteen different scripts and more than seven hundred dialects. There are also 
nine major religions and countless forms of  spirituality practiced in this subcontinent that 
transcend political borders. This not only causes for uniquely complex and varying social 
structures, but a substantial challenge to the democratic system as well. 
	 A land with such a wealth of  diversity as India also suffers from a wealth of  sectarian 
conflicts. Prior to the period of  European colonization in South Asia, there was no singular or 
centralized body of  government. During the colonial era there were attempts to categorize, 
distinguish and define the various ethno-religious and religious groups and their sects in an 
effort to effective govern the many peoples of  South Asia. Today, in the post-independence 
period, the Indian Constitution provides certain legal ramifications to accommodate various 
customs that potentially conflict with State-mandated codes and regulations, including the 
allowance for the adjudication of  personal law under specific circumstances. Here is where 
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the question that is quintessential to the issue of  instant triple talaq in India lies: to what extent 
can a power that claims to be democratic accommodate for or intervene in unique laws and 
customs that are tied to particular religious communities? 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Shatranj Ki Baazi (The Game of Chess) 
	 Shatranj ki baazi, or chess, has been a popular game in India for centuries, and I find it 
to be a suitable metaphor for the predicament in which Indian Muslim women find 
themselves, at a time where the dual nature of  their identities are pitted against one another. 
In this metaphorical game of  chess, picture an uneven playing field. On one side there is a 
Muslim woman and across from her sit her two opponents, the ulema (the Islamic scholarly 
community) and the State, both of  which are historically strong patriarchal forces. Although 
the State and the Islamic scholarly community are enemies, their patriarchal values and have 
placed them on the same side of  the chess board in this metaphor.  
	 Historically, as the next chapter will discuss in detail, the ulema and the State been 
pitted against one another, but their tactics often leave Muslim women caught in the cross 
fires. Under the current Hindu nationalist regime, the ulema is challenged with protecting the 
core exoteric aspects of  Muslim identity, one of  those being personal law. As Muslim women 
are up against these two patriarchal forces that have a history of  taking advantage of  them for 
the sake of  advancing their separate agendas, they––Muslim women––have been attempting 
to assert themselves in this male-dominated and often misogynist minefield, or in this case, a 
chess board, to achieve the rights and protections they deserve. Essentially, Muslim women 
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have been attempting to interrupt the feud between the State and the ulema for the sake of  
their own wellbeing, but are challenged by the need to navigate two competing loyalties. 
	 On every chessboard there are two axes; the vertical one is called the file and the 
horizontal one is the rank. The rank in this imaginary game is symbolic of  the obstacles and 
barriers imposed by the State to which the women’s nationality is clearly tied while the file is 
symbolic of  those imposed by the ulema, a major source of  authority in the Muslim 
community to which their religious identity is tied.  Every move that women make in this 
game of  shatranj is likely to be a compromise on one axis, yet a gain on the other. Sacrifices, 
compromises and an array of  bold decisions are made. Different groups of  women, perhaps 
different generations, different classes and different subcultures may hold conflicting opinions 
and ideas about which move to make. However, what has happened in the case of  instant 
triple talaq in Modi’s India, is quite unique. Muslim women who have been partial to 
defending and reforming Muslim personal law from within a religious framework (Bazm-e-
Khavateen and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board), and Muslim women who have 
been more inclined to support a State whose power extends beyond the adjudicators of  
Muslim personal law (Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan and Nida Khan) have come 
together. These women have united despite their differences to disrupt the patriarchal forces 
that have stood in the way of  their justice. They have prevailed in this game of  strategy in 
which sacrifice and compromise are necessary in order to win.  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CONTEXTUALIZING ISLAMIC SCHOLARSHIP AND MUSLIM 
PERSONAL LAW IN INDIA 
Chapter One 
	 This chapter will provide expository information on the origin and function of  
Muslim personal law, and how it has developed in India from the precolonial period and 
beyond. It will explain the complexities and irregularities of  customs and adjudication of  
Muslim personal law due to the historical plurality of  Indian societies. Lastly, it will analyze 
the impact of  the British colonization of  India on this plurality and Muslim cultures and 
personal laws, and describe the discrimination and violence Muslim are faced with under a 
Hindutva (Hindu-nationalist) prime minister. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Understanding Muslim Personal Law in India 
	 Contrary to the popular opinion of  Western media and governments, the large canon 
of  Islamic law that contains personal law is not comparable to the sets of  laws that govern 
nation-states, though it can be used to influence them. In those contexts, laws are created and 
developed by a small group of  people with various educational backgrounds and 
certifications, who seek to create solutions for the mundane problems they witness in society. 
Islamic law, on the other hand, is not created entirely by man. It is complex, varying among 
multiple schools of  law (Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and more for Sunnis), from various regions 
and sects (Sunni, Shia, Ismaili, etc.). It is a system of  regulations and guidelines largely 
derived from those established in the Qur’an, which is believed to be the direct word of  God. 
In addition to this text, elements of  Islamic law are also derived from the Sunna, which is best 
described as concrete examples of  how the Prophet Muhammad lived his life. These 
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examples are extracted from the hadith, which are reports from eyewitnesses of  the Prophet’s 
actions and sayings. These are the two main sources of  Islamic law, but there is a slew of  
other factors that play into development of  this system of  guidelines that requires a network 
of  individuals who perform specific roles in the process of  studying and interpreting texts, as 
well as analyzing and comparing the events, contexts and actions of  the Prophet and the early 
caliphs. Among those individuals are jurists, qazis, muftis, and scholars who make up the ulema.  
	 Prior to the colonial period and the transition to being a nation-state, many Muslim 
communities operated under the guidance of  these individuals. Matters that required some 
level of  officiation or witness were often handled by the qazis who served as judges officiating 
marriages and notarizing contracts. The mufti in a community served as a “private legal 
specialist who was legally and morally responsible for the society in which he lived, not the 
ruler and his interests.”  He also would issue fatwas, which are non-binding suggestions to 5
individuals, groups, or the society as a whole. These men were seen as high authority figures 
serving in the courts of  the emperors and rulers to offer their advice. The jurists were 
renowned scholars who had superior understandings of  the hadiths, Sunna, Qur’an and thus 
were most capable of  practicing ijtihad and qiyas. The first practice—ijtihad— is the process of  
interpreting and rationalizing the law using the sources of  Islamic law while the second 
consists of  using analogies to determine the appropriate response or action in a given context 
or situation. The structure of  this system and network allow for adaptation of  the laws 
provided by the Qur’an and Sunna to new and changing societies and technologies, but also 
allows for a vast range of  differences in interpretation and understanding of  the laws. These 
 Hallaq, Wael B. “The Law in the Age of  Nation-states” in Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge 5
University Press, 2009, 9.
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various understandings are published in volumes of  fiqh (jurisprudence), and while scholars 
and jurists of  one school of  law can publish various fiqh doctrines, the content of  fiqh varies 
the most between the different schools.  
	 It is important to consider all of  this in the context of  precolonial India. There were, 
and in many ways still are, very pluralistic societies under the multiple empires that 
simultaneously governed the region. Although this system of  operating personal law was 
present in Muslim communities, it was often influenced by the cultures and traditions in its 
midst. As Mengia Tschalaer points out, Muslims in pre-colonial India were by no means 
uniform in their practices. Some Muslims were known to refer to Smirti law  for matters of  6
inheritance; some blended local and regional traditions and practices with those of  Islamic 
importance.  Furthermore, the very structure of  the development of  the Shariat was 7
nonuniform in that it largely relies on interpretations, and leadership that is localized rather 
than centralized so that there is no “coherent Islamic framework.” Tschaler explains in detail:  
“the laws that developed in various parts of  Muslim India differ greatly in terms of  
their textual sources, mod of  interpretation (ijtihad), and manners of  adjudication. In 
fact, the boundaries between the equally diverse Hindu laws and Muslim laws were at 
time fluid, or, ‘fuzzy’ as Kaviraj, (1992, 20—1) terms it. For example, there were 
instances where converted Muslims followed their earlier non-Islamic customs and 
practices (for example, joint family property system of  coparcenary), and some 
Muslim community, such as Khojars, the Sunni Bhora, and Molesalam Girasias were 
governed by the Hindu law so far as inheritance and succession were concerned 
(Fyzee 1964, 63).”  8
 Smriti or Manu-Smriti (lit. “the laws of  Manu”) is traditionally considered the most authoritative code 6
of  Hindu personal law.
 Tschalaer, Mengia Hong. Muslim Women’s Quest for Justice: Gender, Law and Activism in 7
India. Cambridge University Press, 2017, 12.
 Tschalaer, Muslim Women’s Quest for Justice, 5.8
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Thus, Islamic law is unlike any written and discrete codes or laws that are accompanied by 
methods of  enforcement, but rather an abstract concept. Grounded in this system one can 
find an often complex, and sometimes conflicting, guide to being a proper or successful 
Muslim and forming a successful Muslim society. There are variations in jurisprudence given 
at different times and places, and there are certainly variations in what is actually practiced as 
Muslim communities around the world have been and are still influenced by surrounding 
cultures, changes in technology and most notably by the colonialism and the subsequent 
development of  the independent nation-state.  
	 Regarding classical jurisprudence on marriage and dissolution of  marriage, the five 
main schools of  thought—Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi’i and Jafari’—differ on some 
details, yet the Jafari’ Shia school strictly rejects instant triple talaq. The Hanafi law is the 
primary school upheld in South Asia, thus this essay will mainly focus on the laws and 
practices of  that school. Marriage is viewed as a contractual agreement in Hanafi law, and 
this contract is called a nikahnama. Under most circumstances when the bride has yet to reach 
maturity, this contract requires a witness (normally male although sometimes a female witness 
is allowed). A dower, or maher—a sum of  money or gift from the groom to the bride––is also 
required and cannot be revoked at any time; it is to remain fully in the possession of  the wife. 
Like any contract, one can attach stipulations that serve as protections of  an individual’s 
interests or to set the standards and ramifications of  the agreement. Though it is not the sole 
purpose, for women this can be used as a tool to insert certain protections against abuse or 
unjust treatment by her husband. These can include a range of  demands from the couple not 
moving too far from the wife’s family home to “financial penalties”; for example, a woman 
can demand a higher dower if  the man has another wife already or wishes to marry again in 
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the future. Unfortunately, as Kecia Ali puts it, “the enforceability of  stipulations is fickle and 
varying” and Maliki, Hanafi and Shafi’i jurists reject any stipulations that bind husbands to 
monogamy or non-relocation.  Muslim women entering marriages in South Asia and many 9
other parts of  the world are either spoken for or obligated to adhere to the will of  their male 
guardian, whose presence is required at the marriage under most circumstances according to 
classical jurisprudence from all five of  the main schools. Of  course, this limits the extent to 
which the woman’s personal interests can be properly advocated for as the nikahnama is 
drafted.  
	 One key mechanism for enforcing the conditions desired by the woman can be the 
consequence of  divorce. A woman can theoretically assert that a divorce shall take place in 
the event of, say, domestic violence or alcoholism.  This is one of  the very few ways in which 10
a woman holds to the power to unilaterally dissolve the marriage, albeit in theory; it is 
doubtful whether or not this practice is used often at the grassroots level. Classical 
jurisprudence recognizes several pathways for a couple to terminate their marriage contract 
and declare a divorce. The Qur’an and the Sunna are clear on the preferred method of  
couples dissolving a marriage; essentially, couples are encouraged to seek arbitration, work 
out their issues through discussion and be patient with one another. There are three types of  
dissolution of  marriage: faskh, khul’ and talaq.  In a faskh, the couple seeks arbitration by an 11
Islamic judge, a qazi, and the judge decides that there is cause for dissolution. Khul’ is a 
 Ali Kecia. “Islamic Marriage” in The Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law. 9
Harvard University Press, 2008, 21.
  Ali, “Islamic Marriage”, 21.10
 Ali, “Islamic Marriage”, 23.11
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dissolution in which both parties are in mutual agreement and the wife returns her dower to 
the husband.  
	 Triple talaq is a unilateral termination of  the marriage by the husband by triple 
annunciation of  the word talaq, which literally means “dismiss” and is most commonly 
translated as “divorce.”  It is this three-step method that is uniquely at the center of  12
controversy over State laws and the adjudication of  Muslim personal law in India. In a most 
properly performed talaq, the husband is to pronounce talaq to his wife once, though not 
during the time of  her menstruation, and wait for a specific period of  time before the next 
pronunciation. Kauser Edappagath claims in his book on Divorce and Gender Equity in Muslim 
Personal Law of  India that “the Qur’an insists on the presence of  two just witnesses to the 
pronouncement of  talaq” , and jurisprudence requires a minimum of  roughly two months 13
between the pronunciation of  each talaq so that the woman undergoes two periods of  tuhr (in 
time in between her menstruations) so that the couple is able to spend enough time together 
to work out their differences and marital problems. This waiting period is called iddat. It is 
tradition for a woman to seclude herself  from her husband while she is menstruating; thus 
this would be an inappropriate time to discuss matters such as divorce and inappropriate for 
the husband to declare a talaq. After sufficient time has passed the husband may issue a 
second and third talaq with iddat taking place between the two, if  his feelings remain 
unchanged. After the iddat following the third invoking of  talaq the marriage is terminated 
and the husband no longer has the unilateral ability to reclaim his wife. This form of  triple 
 Given that the Arabic language provides this specific term for divorce, which not interchangeable 12
with other forms of  dissolution of  marriage, any usage of  the term “divorce” hereinafter will refer 
specifically to talaq.
 Edappagath, Kauser. Divorce and Gender Equity in Muslim Personal Law of  India. LexisNexis, 2014, 75.13
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talaq is often referred to as talaq-e-sunna, with slight variations being called talaq-e-ahsan and 
talaq-e-hasan.  The only way in which the couple could marry again is through the process of  14
nikah halala which requires the woman to marry a different man and consummate the new 
marriage. Only under circumstances of  marriage dissolution, death of  the husband or 
prolonged abandonment can the previous husband seek to remarry his ex-wife, and a new 
nikahnama should be procured. 
	 The origin of  male-initiated unilateral divorce by the husband actually predates 
Islam, although it was improved through the development of  personal law. In the Arabian 
society that existed before Islam, referred to by Muslims as jahilyya, a common practice was 
for husbands to unilaterally divorce their wives instantly, sans justification, and then to take 
them back at any time and place according to the husband’s will. There were absolutely no 
limits on the number of  times one could divorce, or dismiss, and reclaim his wife, nor was 
there any formulaic way of  declaring the divorce. Essentially, husbands could claim anything 
against their wives, divorce them or inflict any injustice unto them and expect little to no 
consequences. Edappagath claims that it would have been impossible for the Prophet to 
entirely abolish this practice, so he took to the path of  reforming it: 
The Prophet had to mould the mind of  an uncultured and semi-barbarous 
community to a higher development. Accordingly, he allowed the exercise of  power 
of  divorce to the husband under certain conditions and gave to the woman the right 
of  obtaining separation on reasonable grounds.  15
The Prophet’s distaste for the pre-Islamic customary method of  dissolving marriage would 
perhaps explain why divorce—particularly a unilaterally invoked one—is strongly 
 Edappagath, Kauser. Divorce and Gender Equity, 77.14
 Edappagath, 72.15
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discouraged and even treated with disdain in Islamic canon, while arbitration and 
compromise are preferred methods of  marital conflict resolution.  
	 Furthermore, this aversion to unilateral male-initiated divorce, or rather this idea that 
the Prophet was compromising with the preexisting culture, could explain why the unilateral 
abilities of  the husband are revoked following the iddat after the final talaq and the process for 
reestablishing the marriage is so difficult, and even impossible if  the woman does not consent 
to remarrying the same man.  Also in contrast to pre-Islamic Arabia, the Qur’an and the 16
Sunna have been clear on the expectations of  a husband to provide for his family both 
materially and financially. Thus, the classical jurists uphold that a husband is to pay 
maintenance to his wife after marriage dissolution. This is similar to the Western concept of  
alimony in that it serves the same purpose, except Muslim personal law stipulates that this 
payment is only due for three consecutive months after the dissolution. 
	 Given all of  this information and clarifications, we must once again contextualize this 
in the Indian subcontinent. Although the many of  media and news sources throughout the 
world and in South Asia––and the title of  this paper for that matter––have referred to the 
current topic of  controversy as “triple talaq”, it is crucial to make the distinction that it is 
actually instant triple talaq that is being discussed. Furthermore, this instant triple talaq is 
something novel and something of  a legal idiosyncrasy in South Asian Hanafism. The 
practice of  triple talaq has evolved in India to often be completed in a single instance, 
sometimes even via text message or voice mail. This instant triple talaq, which does not 
adhere to the requirement of  iddat, has long been controversial within the Muslim community 
 The process for re-marrying after a divorce is called nikah halala. In this process the woman would 16
have had to enter a second, legitimate marriage, consummate it, and undergo a dissolution of  said 
marriage or become widowed or abandoned in order for her first husband to pursue her once more.
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of  India, and is the very practice which recently became the center of  tense public discourse. 
While Hanafi jurists and scholars have always allowed for triple talaq, instant triple talaq came 
to be permitted because of  a legal loophole. In the introduction to his study on the Shah Bano 
Controversy, Ashgar Ali Engineer explains that members of  the ulema who favor instant triple 
talaq “maintain that the Qur’an has not laid down any specific method of  divorce and, 
though the Prophet, they maintain, showed his anger against this form of  divorce, he did not 
indicate that such a divorce would not be valid.”  Although the practice has been banned in 17
twenty-two countries, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and 
Morocco,  and many Hanafi scholars and jurists strongly oppose it, instant triple talaq has 18
been upheld in India primarily because of  this technicality. 
	 Many scholars, members of  the public and Indian government often refer to instant 
triple talaq as talaq-biddat. The usage of  this Arabic term, sometimes written talaq al-bid’ah, 
appears in works of  the BMMA, AIMWPLB and even in the official Supreme Court 
judgement, and is controversial in its nature. The word bid’ah means “innovation”or 
“unorthodox”, K.N. Ahmad’s book on marriage and divorce explains that “It is highly 
condemned and even declared sinful, but nevertheless it is considered legally effective.”  19
However, it is imperative to understand how this term is most often used within Muslim 
communities. What the term actually implies is that if  the object or practice at hand was not 
present during the time of  the Prophet Muhammad, or was not outright approved by him, it 
 Engineer, Asghar Ali. The Shah Bano Controversy. London: Sangam, 1987, 7.17
 Press Trust of  India. "India's Muslim Neighbours among 23 Countries That Have Banned Triple 18
Talaq." Https://www.hindustantimes.com/. September 19, 2018. Accessed May 11, 2019. https://
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is not to be accepted. For example, this is how the Wahhabi leadership in Saudi Arabia has 
justified prohibiting women to drive, access to certain technologies and dress similar to those 
who lived in the early seventh century BCE. Beyond its fundamental definition, bid’ah has 
become one of  the negotiable words that is used by any entity which wields power over any 
vulnerable group of  Muslims. In order to do this, entities like the Saudi government 
incorporate the concept of  bid’ah in hollow accusations of  unorthodoxy. Although the 
concept is important to the development of  Islamic and Muslim personal law, it can be used 
as a fundamentalist tool for determining what is and is not acceptable.  
	 Following this logic, it could be understood that Indian Muslims’ usage of  this term in 
reference to instant triple talaq is an attempt to subdue the overbearing misogynistic 
authorities. However, the overwhelmingly Hindu Indian government’s recent appropriation 
of  the Islamic term talaq-e-biddat is perhaps problematic as it symbolizes an attempt to use 
Islamic terminology to assert dominance over Islamic authorities. Instant triple talaq is not the 
only method of  dissolving a marriage that is seen as unorthodox, but the fact that it is 
commonly categorized as such is quite problematic for those arguing for the continuation or 
legitimization of  the practice. Due to ambiguity in the Qur’an and Sunna, jurists of  the main 
Sunni schools have discouraged the practice, but continue to recognize its legitimacy. 
Although Hanafi and Maliki law, have been most influential in Indian Muslim Personal law, 
jurists and scholars of  those schools around the world have declared it sinful or simply 
disapprove. The only group to absolutely reject the legitimacy of  instant triple talaq are Shias. 
	 In conclusion, the Shariat is neither divinely inspired nor entirely man-made. Rather, 
it is a mixture of  the two that is established in variety of  ways in a complex and unfixed 
system. The ulema, who master the study of  the sources of  the Shariat and are responsible for 
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adjudicating Muslim personal law face thus they have great responsibility in educating and 
supporting members of  their community. However, given the nature of  power and authority 
within their communities, the members of  the ulema also face a great temptation to abuse 
their authority. As the Indian subcontinent experiences the destructiveness that colonization 
bares on such authoritative institutions, the ulema struggles to preserve its status and ensure a 
space for Muslim personal law through the formation of  a colony and later a nation. 
Throughout these transitions, Muslim women’s rights become more and more vulnerable as 
two patriarchal forces––the State and the ulema—carry on with in their struggle for power. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
The Eﬀects of British Colonial Rule on Personal Law 
	 The issue of  authority and adjudication regarding Muslim family law in India, like 
many of  today’s issues, can be traced back to British colonial rule. Adhering to the classic 
Western colonizer mode of  operation, the British found grounds for instituting their own law 
and order by deeming Indians as heathens and savages—uncivilized. Even more so, they 
harped on what they saw as abhorrent treatment of  women. Partha Chatterjee describes this 
in his chapter on “The Nation and Its Women”: 
Colonialist critics invariably repeated a long list of  atrocities perpetrated on Indian 
women, not so much by men or certain classes of  men, but by an entire body of  
scriptural canons and ritual practices that, they said, by rationalizing such atrocities 
within a complete framework of  religious doctrine, made them appear to perpetrators 
and suffered alike as the necessary marks of  right conduct.   20
The colonial motive had become intertwined with what Chatterjee calls the “civilizing 
mission” as a means of  justification for the exploitative ulterior motive. British efforts to 
 Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. 20
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007, 118.
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“civilize” Indians honed in on traditions and rituals, particularly those involving women, and 
this quickly led to the creation of  Anglo-Mohammadan Law, in which these colonizers 
attempted to codify Muslim personal law. As discussed, Muslim personal law in India was not 
uniform, and there was fluidity between Hindu and Muslim cultures, which led to a plethora 
of  inaccuracies, misunderstandings and misinterpretations by the British that only caused 
negative consequences for their subjects.  
	 Nevertheless, they embarked on this “civilizing” mission, which was rooted in the 
argument that given the traditions, practices and rituals of  Indian culture, particularly those 
involving women, Indian people are “barbaric.” One of  the most obvious consequences was 
a power struggle, a sort of  duel between the British Raj and elite classes of  Indian men 
(Hindu and Muslim) in which Indian women were instrumental to both groups’ goals. Thus, 
women and their rights were often treated merely as instruments, as chess pieces. In this 
struggle, the Indian opposition to colonial-driven modernization developed into a nationalist 
movement by the beginning of  the 19th century, in which the upper classes, who were most 
likely educated in British schools, pushed to defend pre-colonial traditions and customs, 
focusing on enhancing and reestablishing the spiritual rather than the material domain.   21
	 This enhancement was not made to accommodate the modern developments, but 
rather to counter them and were born of  the nationalist sentiments. The domestic world 
became the designated abode of  spirituality while the public was a place for material aspects 
of  life, and as the patriarchy asserted itself  over the material world and took on the burden of  
modernization in that sphere, it pushed women to become the keepers of  indigenous 
 Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments,116.21
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spirituality and assume the burden of  protecting the values that came with that.  This divide 22
is at the core of  nationalist efforts in the twentieth century, and as tensions deepened between 
Hindus and Muslims, indigenous spirituality came to mean Hindu spirituality. 
	 Precolonial India was by no means a united, uniform nation with a central culture or 
religion or anything of  the sort. The subcontinent was inhabited by a diverse population, 
hundreds of  spoken and written languages, multiple dynasties, religions and sects, customary 
laws and cultural systems. A major component of  the British’s operation was to divide, 
categorize and codify. In this process, the British took to defining the barriers between the 
cultures and the peoples they encountered, and develop new policies that would optimize 
their economic gain. Overtime, these policies would inhibit Indian women’s access to 
independent wealth and autonomy as the newly imposed customs for inheritance, land 
ownership and economic activities forced women to become more dependent on their male 
family members.  
	 Where lines between cultures and religious groups were blurred, the British solidified 
them by developing codes and legislation for governing Hindus and Muslims as mutually 
exclusive groups. Thus, the British established a formal institution for Muslim personal law 
infused with British principles and values. However, the nuances, fluidity and complications 
of  customary and religious laws pertaining to family and personal matters stood as an 
immense challenge for these white men attempting to “save” brown women from brown men 
as Spivak puts it in her monumental piece, Can the Subaltern Speak. Since developing a State-
regulated, systematic rule of  law is essential to the operation of  ruling and colonizing a 
people, the British were practically stunned when it came to the Shariat. Eventually, Anglo-
 Chatterjee, 126.22
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Mohammadan Law developed as the colonial authorities made efforts to fuse British 
principles and laws with Muslim cultural and religious customs that were rooted in the 
Shariat. They went about slowly, over the course of  the 19th and 20th centuries, piecing 
together a system of  codes based partly on legislation, but especially on judicial precedent;  23
consequentially, the ulema’s power and authority declined. 
	 In an attempt to retain power and protect Islamic law, the members of  the Deoband 
scholarly community established dar-ul-qazas, courts that operated on Sunni law to rule family 
matters. It was also, however, an attempt to spare the spiritual domain and domestic spaces, 
from colonization. The Muslim League, bolstered by the ulema, proposed legislation that 
required Muslims to be governed by Muslim personal law, and soon after, the colonial power 
passed the Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of  1937. This law proved their acceptance 
of  the authority of  these Shariat-based courts for matters that concern the family and 
household, which had historically been treated as a political unit in Indian societies, a well as 
a compromise in authority. The British were now limited in their ability to impose on the 
spiritual domain of  Muslims. This is laid out in Section II of  the act as quoted below.  24
Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions 
relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of  
females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or 
any other provision of  Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of  marriage, including 
talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, 
trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions 
 Roff, William R. “Customary Law, Islamic Law, and Colonial Authority: Three Contrasting Case 23
Studies and Their Aftermath.” Islamic Studies 49, no. 4 (2010): 455-62. http://
www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stable/41581119.
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and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of  decision in cases where the 
parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).  25
Similar to much legislation coming from the British Raj, this reform was not received entirely 
without controversy. Section V of  the Shariat Act of  1937 required for Muslim marriages to 
be dissolved in State-run courts under certain circumstances, which was more than 
displeasing to the Muslim patriarchy. In a further reach for control and authority, the ulema 
achieved the repeal of  this clause with the passing of  the Dissolution of  Muslim Marriages 
Act (DMMA) in 1939. The Act specifies that a Muslim woman seeking to dissolve her 
marriage must provide a reason, or reasons that are acceptable under Muslim personal law.  26
	 So, on one hand was the civilizing mission of  the British, which was founded on the 
saving of  Indian women from Indian men, on account of  oppression and abuse. On the other 
was a class of  Muslim leaders striving to tighten their grip on family affairs in the mission to 
save Muslim women from the destructiveness of  modernization and colonization. In this 
equation, there were plenty of  women siding with the ulema, who wanted to fight against 
colonization by strengthening religious institutions. However, at the forefront of  these 
institutions were patriarchal forces perpetuating a lack of  inclusiveness in the decision making 
process. The political status that these institutions achieve symbolize the transition of  the 
spiritual domain from a private, domestic space  to a very public one, which is how the 
Muslim patriarchy justified the exclusion of  women. Both the ulema, a community made up 
almost entirely of  men, and the British forces—equally patriarchal, although the power of  
white women in the colonizing process is not to be underestimated—were justifying their 
every move as an effort to improve the standards for Muslim women. However, as nationalism 
 The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, § II (1937).25
 Dissolution of  Muslim Marriages Act (1939).26
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evolved and persisted, “the issue of  ‘female emancipation’ seem[ed] to disappear from the 
public agenda of  nationalist agitation.”  Chatterjee argues that disappearance is not because 27
the nationalists declined to make women’s issues a topic for political debate, but rather they 
refused to negotiate women’s freedoms, rights and conditions with the colonial powers whose 
only goal was political and economic gain.  
	 This position on women’s rights extended beyond the Muslim community to nearly all 
groups belonging to this relatively new Indian nationality. For women trying to take this 
matter into their own hands, the battle was not publicly fought, as it historically has been in 
the West. In colonial India, rather, women took action from within domestic realm, the home 
of  the spiritual domain. Thus, it was not something that can easily be studied, or categorized 
as any sort of  movement, as the evidence of  this struggle cannot be found in pubic 
documents, historical reports or anything of  the such. Chatterjee explains that through 
personal diaries, autobiographies and other personal artifacts, it is clear that this was the 
space in which many Indian women fought to define for themselves what it means to be an 
Indian woman as the nationalist idea of  “woman” solidified more and more in public and 
political contexts where the patriarchy and nationalism reigned.  28
	 Regarding Muslims, specifically, and nationalism, the independence declared in 1947, 
did not reap the all the same benefits for Muslims as it did for others. The nationalist 
movement took on the primary identity of  Hinduism—that is Hindu traditions, histories, 
culture and spirituality. Thus, when the colonizers were finally expelled, a great rift had 
 Chatterjee, 132.27
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solidified between Muslims and Hindus in the new nation which was tasked with establishing 
an identity and a narrative to present on the world stage. 
	 Throughout the colonization of  India, the ulema witnessed drastic changes to its role 
in society, as did Indian Muslim women. The laws enacted under the British Raj 
tremendously reconstructed social and legal structures and institutions throughout the 
subcontinent. The consequences of  this manifested in conflicts that endured for generations, 
and are ongoing even today. Tensions between Hindus and Muslims sprouted from the British 
policies that defined these groups and incorporated them into the colonial system in different 
ways, all but erasing the memory of  two fluid and coexisting forms of  religion. The spiritual 
domain further became isolated to domestic spaces, especially for Muslims who remained in 
India after the formation of  East and West Pakistan in 1947, and so it was Muslim women 
who took on the burden of  protecting Islamic culture and tradition.  During these shifts in 29
national identity and power, Muslims faced persecution and discrimination under the law, 
and Muslim women were pressed to prioritize their religious identity over their gender. 
Therefore, issues of  gender inequality and misogyny that under personal law struggled to 
receive much attention. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Timeline of State Intervention in Muslim Personal Law 
This timeline features eight significant occasions in which the State––be it the British 
Raj or the Indian government––interfered with Muslim personal law. Looking through these 
 East and West Pakistan were established as a separate country just north of  India in what became 29
known as the Partition. Millions of  people were displaced and massacred as Hindus from the new 
country of  Pakistan fled across the boarders to the newly formed India, and Muslims fled from India 
to Pakistan. It was at this point that Muslims became a significant minority in India and marginalized 
religious group as the new, independent nation of  India took on a predominately Hindu identity.
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landmark pieces of  legislation and Supreme Court cases, one can recognize a declining trend 
in the amount of  authority Muslim personal law is legally able to maintain in the lives of  
Indian Muslims from the colonial period to Modi’s regime. The most important cases to note 
are those of  Shah Bano in 1985, which is coincidentally around the rise of  the BJP, and 
Shayara Bano in 2016 (not related). These cases pushed the limits of  personal law in lieu of  
State law, challenging the authority of  the ulema, while also indicating that Muslim women 
were becoming increasingly frustrating with the Muslim patriarchy’s interpretation of  Islamic 
laws which perpetuates abuse and misogyny.  
1937 
 The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act 
	 This legislation was passed under British colonial rule and ensures that the Muslims in 
India are governed by the Muslim personal law as codified by the British with the guidance 
of  the ulema. However, it restricts the adjudication of  personal law strictly to matters of  family 
law, which includes marriage, dissolution of  marriage, inheritance etc. For the ulema, it is a 
significant win, establishing a degree of  State-sanctioned authority of  the dar-ul-qazas and the 
network of  scholars and jurists.  
1939  
The Dissolution of  Marriage Act 
	 The majority of  Muslims in the subcontinent had been adhering to Hanafi law, which 
maintains the severest restrictions on dissolution of  marriage, especially for women who wish 
to initiate the process. In fact, records show a significant increase in the number of  women in 
the early twentieth century who resorted to denouncing Islam for the sake of  obtaining a 
divorce through the courts. Urdu poet, philosopher and sociopolitical commentator, Iqbal, 
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urged members of  the ulema to reform Hanafi law in an effort to alleviate some of  the 
pressures driving Muslim women to denounce Islam or to remain trapped in unbearable 
marriages. In 1931, a fatwa was issued by Maulana Ashraf  Ali Thanavi, a prominent 
influencer in the scholarly community, titled Al-Hilat un-Najiza li’l-Halitat al-‘Ajiza or "A 
Successful Legal Device for the Helpless Wife.” He argued that if  Muslim women could not 
obtain grounds by which to dissolve their marriage under Hanafi law, they could seek a 
judicial dissolution of  the marriage on the basis of  Maliki law. The combining of  these two 
different schools of  law is a practice called takhayyur, and it made its way into this landmark 
piece of  legislation of  1939. Under this act judicial dissolution of  marriage was to be granted 
to a woman under conditions of  cruelty, insanity, impotence, disappearance or imprisonment 
or failure to fulfill duties by the husband.  30
1981 
 Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 103, Mohammad Ahmad Khan vs. MP 
High Court 
	 The Supreme Court upheld a Madhya Pradesh High Court decision based on 
Criminal Penal Code 125, and required husbands to make provision for their divorced wives 
if  they have no other means of  sustenance until they remarry or die. This would require 
Muslim husbands to pay maintenance beyond the period of  iddat. Ultimately the Court stated 
that the Criminal Penal Code is to prevail over personal law in places where the two conflict.  
	 The panel of  Supreme Court Judges invoked a verse from the Qur’an on 
maintenance, Verse 241- Chapter II: “For divorced women maintenance (should be provided) 
 Minault, Gail. “Women, Legal Reform, and Muslim Identity.” Comparative Studies of  South Asia, Africa 30
and the Middle East 17, no. 2 (1997): 1-10. 
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on a reasonable (scale). This is a duty on the righteous.”  The All India Muslim Personal 31
Law Board claimed the Supreme Court had no right to interpret the Qur’an, nor interfere 
with Muslim personal law. They then launch a campaign against the judgement referred to as 
the “agitation.”  32
1985  
Mohammad Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum 
	 A Supreme Court panel made up of  five Hindu judges decided that Shah Bano 
Begum was entitled to maintenance beyond the period of  iddat under section 125 of  the Code 
of  Criminal Procedure. This case was a national spectacle as it challenged the authority of  
Muslim personal law in instances where it conflicts with the laws of  the nation-state. Until 
this case concluded, Muslim women had been receiving monthly financial support for only 
three months following the dissolution of  their marriages. Women like Shah Bano who were 
suddenly thrown out of  their husband’s home after being instantly divorced were destined for 
financial hardship in the struggle to earn money and support their children, as three months 
was not enough time to recover their financial stability. Meanwhile, the Indian government 
had long upheld that husbands who were not governed by Muslim personal law were 
obligated to pay maintenance to their wives until their children reached adulthood or the 
woman remarried. 
	 This decision prompted legislation that required Muslim men to pay their wives 
maintenance beyond the period of  iddat, despite the Islamic jurisprudence and the authority 
of  Muslim personal law in family matters granted by the 1937 legislation. Marches, protests 
 The Qur’an, surah 2, verse 241.31
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and conferences were hosted by prominent Muslim figures and organizations throughout the 
country, including the AIMPLB. This became known as “the agitation” and it prompted the 
strengthening of  Muslim opposition to State interference in personal law. The agitation was 
especially fueled by the recent augmentation of  Hindu nationalism as the BJP came onto the 
political scene.  
	 For Muslim women’s activists, this secular decision became a major turning point and 
sparked a great diversification of  approaches to activism and positions on the Unified Civil 
Code (UCC). Many leading activists, including Madhu Kishwar, founder of  the feminist 
Manushi magazine, who expressed concern for a UCC that would be severely influenced by 
Hindu nationalists. The nation was shocked to find self-proclaimed feminists and women’s 
rights activists in the Muslim community side with patriarchal forces such as the ulema and 
AIMPLB on this issue. Furthermore, this case proposed an answer to a question that had 
been on the minds of  Muslim citizens since the formation of  an independent India, and after 
the devastation of  Partition: to what extent can a power that claims to be democratic 
accommodate for or intervene in unique laws and customs that are tied to particular religious 
communities? The Shah Bano controversy provided two possible resolutions to this question: 
either the State was going to allow Muslim personal law to precede the constitution, or it was 
going to assume authority over personal law. The fervent protests against the Supreme Court 
decision that enacted its reversal allowed for a decades-long delay in defining the relationship 
between the State and religion. 
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1986  
Muslim Women (Protection of  Rights on Divorce) Bill 
	 Following the fervent public response to the final judgement on Shah Bano case, 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi orchestrated a response that would be an attempt to ameliorate 
the tensions. The 1986 bill countered the Supreme Court decision by relieving Muslim men 
of  the duty to pay maintenance beyond the period of  iddat. Instead, this legislation placed the 
financial burden on the family of  the divorced wife, or unto the waqf board (the Islamic 
institution for charity within the Muslim community).  
2016-2017 
 Shayara Bano vs. Union of  India & Others 
	 The Supreme Court Justices JS Khehar, a Sikh, Kurian Joseph a Christian, RF 
Nariman a Parsi, UU Lalit, a Hindu and Abdul Nazeer, a Muslim, heard the case of  Shayara 
Bano and other petitioners who argued that instant triple talaq was neither essential to Islam, 
which would make it a protected practice under Article 25 of  the Indian Consitution, nor 
acceptable according to the Criminal Code as it was “arbitrary” and “discriminatory.” 
Justices Nariman, Lalit and Joseph determined this was not essential to Islam and Muslim 
Personal Law, and voted to declare the instant triple talaq carried out by Bano’s and the other 
petitioners’ husbands invalid. The case will because discussed in further detail in the third 
chapter.  
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2017  
The Muslim Women (Protection of  Rights on Marriage) Bill 
	 This amendment to the 1986 legislation was prompted by the Supreme Court 
decision on the Shayara Bano case, and banned the practice of  instant triple talaq. While the 
legislation was welcomed by many activists and women who had long been seeking its 
dismissal, the ulema and a large community of  Muslims expressed outrage and fear, similar to 
that of  the agitation following the Shah Bano case, over an increasingly violent Hindu 
nationalist regime intervening in Muslim personal law.  
2018  
The Muslim Women (Protection of  Rights on Marriage) 
	 This amendment intends to criminalize instant divorce, with a maximum of  three 
years of  imprisonment for Muslim men guilty of  issuing a in instant talaq in any form, written 
or verbal. After months of  deliberation in the chambers of  Parliament, the PM Modi decided 
to circumnavigate the legislative process by publishing an executive order to criminalize the 
practice. In December of  2018, the lower house of  Parliament, Lok Sabha, voted the bill 
forward to be debated in the upper house, Rajya Sabha, where approval has been stalled by 
gridlock. Without Parliament-approved legislation the executive order will expire, and the act 
will be decriminalized.  
❃ ❃ ❃ 
	 The eight cases and laws featured in this section summarize the history of  State 
intervention in Muslim personal and the development of  laws on Muslim marriage and 
divorce from the Colonial Era to today’s India. The earliest law featured, the 1937 Shariat 
Application Act, laid the foundation for the separation of  power between the State and the 
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ulema where matters of  family law were concerned. The Dissolution of  Muslim Marriages Act 
that was passed just two years later represents the last time that the ulema expanded rights and 
mobility for women within Islamic marriage. Simultaneously, it restricted the British Raj’s 
ability to encroach on the ulema’s power over the Islamic institution of  marriage. Each of  the 
Supreme Court cases—Shah Bano’s and Shayara Bano’s being the most important––serve as 
key examples of  the modern Indian government’s struggle to determine the amount of  power 
and authority it should delegate to the ulema under the Constitution, with Shayara Bano’s 
case revealing a new, radical direction. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Muslims in Modi’s India 
	 In order to understand the reasons for the hyper-politicization of  triple talaq and the 
Shayara Bano case, it is crucial to understand and consider the social and political context of  
time. The relationship between this particular religious minority and the State. In saying to 
“Modi’s India,” I am referring not only to the State in which this person is the Prime 
Minister, but the State in which the political majority is a powerful group rooted in Hindu 
nationalism, or the Hindutva movement. This movement, founded on the ideas of  one V.D. 
Sarvarkar, who imagined a militarized patriotism that strived to cleanse India of  anyone that 
was anti-Hinduism, which he characterized as anyone not a Hindu. He also defined a Hindu, 
not only by religious identity, but by nationality, claiming that a Hindu is someone who 
considers the subcontinent (he was writing in 1923 before the partition that created East and 
West Pakistan) his fatherland and the cradle of  his religion. This is the very idea upon which 
the Bharatiya Janata Party established itself  in 1984, and the goal towards which it has been 
advancing ever since.  
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Godhra Riots 
	 On the morning of  February 27th, 2002 a train headed from Ayodya (a popular 
Hindu pilgrimage site in Uttar Pradesh) to Ahmedabad, Gujarat stopped in the 
predominately Muslim town of  Godhra. Amidst the hundreds of  Hindus chanting on the 
train, a fire erupted killing nearly sixty passengers and igniting a series of  deadly riots and 
massacres throughout the state. To this day, vile and terrifying stories of  torture and heinous 
murders continue to surface. A 2005 report declared the initial fire an accident, though the 
immediate assumption that a Muslim or group of  Muslims was responsible for the train fire 
had already planted a firm, deep division between the two religious groups. The reported 
death toll surpassed 1,000,  while the number of  displaced peoples surpassed 150,000. In the 33
aftermath 94 people were put on trial, twenty sentenced to life in prison and eleven sentenced 
to death.  34
	 Just four months before these bloody events took place, Narendra Modi––a member 
of  the BJP with little experience in government––became the Chief  Minister of  his home 
state, Gujarat. By the very next day, Modi’s aides had endorsed a state-wide strike, escalating 
and legitimizing the violent attacks. The new Chief  Minister and puppet master “presided 
over the well organized and systematic liquidation of  the life, liberty, property, business and 
dignity of  lakhs  of  Muslims across Gujarat” to convey a message that would ring throughout 35
 Afp. "How India's 2002 Gujarat Riots Unfolded." Dawn. June 17, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/33
news/1265474. 
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#time287_8190. 
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his political career “ [the] Muslim minority can live in India only if  they can win the goodwill 
of  the Hindu majority.”  36
	 Indian headlines in the coming weeks read “Parliament slams Narendra Modi for 
carnage, but Hindutva hardliner may gain politically from anti-Muslim violence,”  “Police 37
accused of  indifference”  and “BJP fiddles while Gujarat burns.”  The nation watched as 38 39
the trials began to unfold; accusations and suspicion of  corruption as certain BJP officials 
escaped severe charges, and Modi’s popularity within the Hindu-nationalist, Hindutva, 
movement and the BJP increased. Although the Congress party and nearly every other party 
and group in the country accused Modi and the BJP of  inciting the riots, the strength of  the 
BJP continued to grow, and in 2014 Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister of  India.  
	 The BJP’s support for Modi after these riots signified their goals for a future India; 
one in which the nation was cleansed of  Muslims. For Muslim women, this came with pressure 
to prioritize the defense of  their religious identities over the fight for gender justice. Modi’s 
2014 rise to Prime Minister, strengthened these pressures as the Muslim community braced 
itself  for an indefinite period of  persecution and turmoil.  
 Patel, Girish. "Narendra Modi's One-Day Cricket: What and Why?" Economic and Political Weekly 37, 36
no. 48 (2002): 4826-837. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stable/4412905.
 Mahurkar, Uday. "Gujarat Riots: Parliament Slams Narendra Modi for Carnage, but Hindutva 37
Hardliner May Gain Politically from Anti-Muslim Violence." India Today. September 21, 2012. 
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/20020318-gujarat-riots-is-narendra-modi-
the-villain-who-allowed-mobs-to-seek-revenge-for-godhra-795729-1999-11-30.
 Tnn. "Police Accused of  Indifference | Ahmedabad News - Times of  India." The Times of  India. 38
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/Police-accused-of-indifference/articleshow/
2402171.cms.
 Varadarajan, Siddharth, and Tnn. "BJP Fiddles While Gujarat Burns | India News - Times of  39
India." The Times of  India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/BJP-fiddles-while-Gujarat-
burns/articleshow/2403856.cms.
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BJP Propoganda  
	 If  one takes a road through Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh or any of  the 
several states which serve as BJP strongholds today, one could hardly escape the countless 
billboards, murals, flags and flyers with the faces of  Modi or the BJP lotus.  The urban 40
landscape of  India is absolutely plastered with images and slogans of  the Prime Minister, his 
party and its associates. Major news sources like Zee News, Republic and Times Now are 
owned by affiliates and members of  this party, which means that a large percentage of  the 
information disseminated on popular platforms is likely to be censored and biased. Paired 
with the propaganda that infiltrates one’s mind via visual stimulation, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult for many to avoid subscribing to BJP ideologies. 
	 While the information available on current issues becomes susceptible to State-
sponsored censorship and bias, so does the information on historical events and figures. 
Attempts to erase India’s history of  rich, strong Muslim empires are manifested in name 
changes of  destinations; Allahabad became Prayagraj, Faizabad district became Ayodhya, 
Ahmedabad (one of  the central sites of  the Godhra riots) became Karnavati. Every week it 
seems new proposals are pouring in for cities to be renamed. At the stoops of  mosques and 
sites of  Islamic architecture like Char Minar, makeshift temples are sprouting up over night. 
The Taj Mahal, one of  the most famous buildings in the world, has been at the center of  this 
sort of  erasure discourse as BJP members propose excluding it from Indian tourism materials 
with one Member of  Parliament (MP) even stating that it was a “blot on Indian culture” and 
“built by traitors.”  This strategy of  rededicating history is dangerous for those whose 41
ancestors are now being considered “enemies” of  the State both in the past and today. 
 In Hinduism, the lotus is a symbol of  purity and is connected to the concept of  enlightenment. The 40
BJP uses this symbol as their logo. 
 "Indian Politician: 'Taj Mahal Built by Traitors'." BBC News. October 16, 2017. https://41
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41635770.
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Hate Crimes and Discrimination 
	 The number of  recorded hate crimes increased after Modi took on his new position as 
MP. Lynchings, murders, public riots, rapes and kidnappings flood the cover of  newspapers 
throughout the country on a weekly basis. In 2017 IndiaSpend, a nonprofit run by the 
Spending & Policy Research Foundation in Mumbai, published a report sourced from 
English-language media on the different types of  hate crimes aimed toward Muslims in the 
country. Although the State does not distinguish religious-based hate crimes from others, nor 
account for communal violence in its data collection, IndiaSpend found that incidents of  
communal violence increased by 28% between 2014 and 2017.  Cow vigilantes, Hindus who 42
seek to harm individuals (often Muslims, or suspected Muslims) transporting or consuming 
beef, frequented social media platforms with videos of  their proudly committed assaults on 
Muslim truck drivers, restaurant owners and bystanders in the baazars.  
	 Some Hindus have taken to defending the rape of  Muslim women and children as an 
act of  patriotism. The 2018 case of  an eight year-old Kathua  girl named Asifa gained 43
international attention. Asifa was kidnapped and dragged into a temple in which she was 
repeatedly assaulted by the temple’s groundskeeper, his nephew and two police officers––all 
of  whom were Hindu. The girl was then murdered in the temple, and the perpetrators 
justified this as an attempt to expel the minority community from the area.  The incident 44
 “Lynch Mobs, ‘Cow Vigilantes’ and Whatsapp: What Hate Looks like in India.” The Washington Post. 42
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/reports-of-hate-crime-cases-have-spiked-in-
india/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.41956db44d76.
 The Kathuas are an extremely poor group of  Muslims in the northern region of  Jammu.43
 Press Trust of  India. “Kathua Rape Victim Was Sexually Assaulted, Died of  Asphyxia: Doctors Tell 44
Court.” Hindustan Times. Https://www.hindustantimes.com/. September 09, 2018. Accessed May 11, 
2019. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kathua-rape-victim-was-sexually-assaulted-died-
of-asphyxia-doctors-tell-court/story-4nOgLfG4v65R6ZAPJA93UI.html.
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took place in January, but it was not until April that the Prime Minister released public 
statements and the case picked up attention in the media, as there were several attempts by 
local officials to protect the rapists. 
	 It has been apparent through hate crimes and erasure of  Muslim history and identity 
in the country supported by and sometimes even instructed by the heads of  state that political 
tensions have transcended into violence and discrimination that threaten the safety and well-
being of  Muslims throughout the country, especially in regions such as Rajasthan, Gujarat 
and Uttar Pradesh where the BJP maintains a strong, unwavering presence. Since the 
Colonial Era, this is the cultural and political context in which the boldest imposition unto 
Muslim personal law.  
	 Stories of  Muslims unable to rent apartments, purchase homes or achieve promotions 
in their place of  work are increasingly common, though they were never particularly rare in 
the more immediate post-Partition period. Challenges in escaping generational cycles of  
poverty, obtaining basic and higher education, and sustainable living situations are severe 
enough for hundreds of  millions of  Indians living in poverty everyday. However, the patterns 
of  discrimination and violence that affect Muslims are being strengthened by the Hindu 
nationalist movement and intensify the marginalization of  Muslims in India today.  
❃ ❃ ❃ 
	 The information provided in this chapter summarizes the long, and complex 
relationship between Muslims and the State that has developed from the Colonial Era to the 
Modi Prime Ministership. It is important to understand that while the ulema and the general 
Muslim public have endured centuries of  oppression in the region, the internal debates and 
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further development of  Muslim personal law remain stifled by today’s oppressive regime as 
the community is likely to endure further State-sanctioned violence and oppression. The 
fluidity of  Muslim personal law and Muslim identity still exists in many forms today, yet the 
external threats to the Muslim community as a whole, have allowed for the prolonged 
silencing of  minorities and marginalized groups, such as women, on an internal level of  the 
diverse demographic. As such, the rise of  muslim women’s activist groups, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter, signifies a rebellion from within, a refusal to remain 
silenced and a commitment to prioritizing the reformation of  Muslim women’s rights.  
	 The description of  Modi’s anti-Muslim agenda and his party’s excessive and 
overwhelming propaganda are the greatest obstacles in the way of  Muslim women trying to 
speak up against the injustices and abuses being perpetuated by the Muslim patriarchy. In this 
game of  chess, each movement in the direction that criticizes any aspect of  an Islamic 
institution or practice can be considered a betrayal to the Muslim community and a gesture 
of  alliance with the Modi regime.  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MUSLIM WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND THE MUSLIM 
PATRIARCHY 
Chapter Two 
	 While instant triple talaq has been a controversial issue within Muslim communities of  
India for generations, it has become hyper-politicized, largely due to the burgeoning 
dominance of  violent Hindu nationalism––especially since the Godhra riots of  2002. The 
pressure on the ulema to retain its status in adjudicating Muslim personal law and its authority 
in the community resembles that of  the Colonial Era. In the decade leading up to the 2017 
Supreme Court ruling that instant triple talaq was not a protected religious practice and 
should be banned, the nation witnessed a surge of  Muslim women’s activism concerning 
issues of  marriage and divorce. This chapter will provide an overview of  who the most 
prominent groups and individuals such as the at the center of  public discourse and activism 
surrounding the instant divorce controversy. The groups profiled in this chapter were selected 
not only because of  their centrality to the discourse, but also because of  their unique stances 
on the relationship between State and religion and their approaches to activism. To put this 
in the context of  a shtaranj ki baazi, once again, each group of  Muslim women who fought for 
the abolition of  instant triple talaq as a part of  the grander fight for further equality and 
protection, faced a labyrinth of  challenges. The dilemma of  sacrificing one’s strong allegiance 
with a male-dominated group, or with those who abhor State intervention, means being 
criticized by one’s own community. It means opening oneself  up for future, potentially 
unwanted State intervention.  
	 This chapter presents a profile of  four women’s organizations and one male-
dominated organization which serves as a symbol of  the ulema. It analyzes the differences in 
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their styles of  activism––whether they are secular or not, or traditionally supportive of  State 
intervention and how these characteristics may have changed. The chapter then discusses 
how some of  these organizations revived a movement that aimed to provide women more 
justice and protections in their marriage contracts as an attempt to change the gender politics 
from within the Muslim community. Finally, the chapter will tie in the geopolitical similarities 
of  these organizations and the symbolic significance of  the location that has now become the 
stage for the instant triple talaq controversy. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
All India Muslim Personal Law Board 
	 Founded in Mumbai in 1972, the AIMPLB has been at the forefront of  every major 
conflict between the State and the broad Indian-Muslim community. This organization was 
never meant to steer clear of  politics, thus its leaders have become public figures, often 
featured in televised and broadcasted debates and discussions. The entire organization is 
made up of  more than two-hundred members; among them women make up 19% of  the 
general members, 0.01% of  the founding members and 0.1% of  the executive committee. 
The AIMPLB pulls Islamic scholars, political figures and influential leaders from twenty-three 
states. 
	 The Board has many different initiatives centered around issues ranging from activism 
in support of  Babari Masjid,  to establishing a system of  dar-ul-qazas (Shariat courts, lit. 45
house of  adjudication) throughout the country. While these dar-ul-qazas refrain from issuing 
 The site of  Babari Masjid is located in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. Disputes over whether the mosque 45
was originally a Hindu temple resulted in nationwide riots between Hindus and Muslims in the early 
90s. 
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fatwas, nor are they eligible to administer criminal law, they do flex their authority over 
Muslim family law. According to Tschalaer, these courts “hold considerable power in the legal 
landscape”  as they provide a variety of  services to Indian Muslim families from arbitration 46
to providing and certifying marriage contracts.  
	 The organization’s mission is rooted in preserving the authority of  the ulema and 
Muslim personal law against the Uniform Civl Code (UCC) and any “indirect legislative 
measures” passed in an effort to progress the adoption of  this code. Regarding instant triple 
talaq, the AIMPLB has resolved that not only is the bill banning the practice against Muslim 
personal law against the Indian constitution which permits the practices of  customary law, it 
is first and foremost a bill that boldly intervenes in the Shariat which is “in and of  itself  
harmful to Muslim women.”  The male-dominated Board has faced strong opposition from 47
multiple Muslim women’s groups such as the AIMWPLB, BMMA and in some ways Bazm-e-
Khavateen regarding the 2017 Muslim Women (Protection of  Rights on Marriage) Bill which 
transformed the Supreme Court ruling into legislation and the subsequent 2019 legislation 
which criminalized it. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Bazm-e-Khavateen 
	 Established in British India in 1934 by the old bourgeoisie of  Lucknow, Uttar 
Pradesh, Bazm-e-Khavateen (trans. Women’s Assembly) is one of  the oldest organizations to 
be discussed in this paper. Its founder, Begum Sultana Hayat, belonged to an elite class and 
 Tschalaer, 53.46
 All India Muslim Personal Law Board. http://www.aimplboard.in/important-resolutions.php. 47
Trans. by author.
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took an active role in the various reform movements at the time, particularly those that 
pushed for the modern education of  Muslim women. In its early days, the organization 
hosted gatherings in Zenana Park, a public space that was only available to women—the first 
of  its kind in Lucknow.   48
	 Unlike the AIMWPLB, this organization never intended to challenge the authority of  
religious leaders and organizations like the AIMPLB. In fact, the current President, Shahnaz 
Sidrat, stated that she “would like Bazm-e-Khavateen to become the women’s wing of  the 
AIMPLB.”  According to Tschalaer, who spent time with Sidrat in Lucknow, the leader 49
aligns herself  ideologically with the more orthodox groups, which make up the majority of  
the AIMPLB, while simultaneously lamenting the underrepresentation of  women. She says 
that “Although they have failed to regulate [instant] triple talaq or to effectively adjudicate 
family matters in the Dar-ul-Qaza, they are still 'the only body’ representing our community. 
We have a lot of  things in common, such as the struggle against the practice of  dowry and 
female foeticide.”  Despite disagreeing on the one practice, Sidrat recognizes that religious 50
authorities are often positioned to represent all Muslims on the political stage or to serve as a 
voice for the greater community, and has little to no quarrels about this. She simply hopes 
that Bazm-e-Khavateen may provide a gendered perspective to the discourses and debates in 
various Islamic institutions and organizations that have long been male-dominated.  
	 Aside from regular meetings in Zenana Park, the organization provides Islamic 
education and literacy trainings as well as legal counseling and arbitration in the realm of  
 Tschalaer, 58.	48
 Tschalaer, 57.49
 Tschalaer, 57.50
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family law. Women are also allowed to offer namaz (prayers) in this Zenana Park, making it 
one of  the very few places in the region where women are allowed to worship publicly. In an 
essay on Muslim women’s rights activists, Tschalaer describes an interview she had with 
Sidrat about the direction in which she talks about her efforts to transcend the “binaries of  
women’s empowerment versus Islamic patriarchy.”  51
Muslim women have offered namaz in the Zenana Park for over 75 years. Due to 
relative seclusion of  the park, the religious clergy had never opposed this. As long as 
the gate was shut and the women remained invisible, there was no uproar. However, 
when she became president of  Bazm-e-Khavateen in 1994, Sidrat decided to disrupt 
the spatial boundaries that shielded Muslim women’s activism from the public eye for 
so long. Arguing that ‘purdah [here the term purdah is used in terms of  the spatial 
segregation of  the sexes] is not a hindrance for publicizing Muslim women’s public 
prayers’, she started to invite the press to the weekly meetings. She explains that her 
motivation behind this initiative was less to solely disrupt the well-traveled imagery of  
the subjugation of  Muslim women that to contribute to the creation of  a feminist 
consciousness of  the public space and the fact that women too can engage in religious 
activities outside the domestic sphere.  52
Sidrat’s approach to activism and lack of  interest in participating in discourse centered on 
pitting women’s rights and Islam against one another makes her and Bazm-e-Khavateen 
unique in light of  the other organizations discussed here. It also makes the organization’s 
support for instant triple talaq legislation more significant that any other organization’s 
support for it because their stance symbolizes a major sacrifice in Bazm-e-Khavateen’s 
mission to become a part of  the AIMPLB and counter the anti-ulema sentiments of  many 
popular feminist and women-oriented activist groups in India and around the world. 
 Tschalaer, Mengia Hong. "Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’ Visibility: Stretching the Gendered 51
Boundaries of  the Public Space in the City of  Lucknow." South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 
no. 11 (2015). doi:10.4000/samaj.3928, 17.
 Tschalaer, "Muslim Women’s Rights Activists,” 17.52
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❃ ❃ ❃ 
All India Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board 
	 The AIMWPLB was founded in 2005 by notable activist, Shaista Ambar, who is a 
native of  Allahabad. The organization was established to counter the male-dominated All 
India Muslim Personal Law Board as tensions on women’s issues became increasingly 
prominent. The leaders of  the organization are driven by the idea that the Qur’an and 
Shariat are too often selectively misinterpreted by scholars and Muslim leaders with 
“chauvinistic”, “patriarchal” and “essentialist” in an effort to disadvantage women, 
specifically regarding marriage and divorce. 
	 Housed in a Lucknow mosque that allows men and women to pray together, this 
group consists of  middle class Sunni and Shia Muslim women, serving as bridge between the 
two major sects. Although, the timing of  its formation is ironic if  not a pointed statement as it 
occurred just three months after that of  the All India Shia Muslim Personal Law Board, 
which also splintered out from the AIMPLB. This group, which quickly gained recognition 
due to its noteworthy founder, believes that the realization of  Muslim women’s rights has 
been undermined by the politics surrounding religious identity and ideological differences 
between Sunnis and Shias. Ambar stated that “all maulanas do is to discuss what is Islamic and 
[what is] not. Nobody thinks about all these women who suffer from violence and poverty 
every single day. They have nowhere to go! That’s why we have established the 
AIMWPLB.”  53
 Tschalaer, 62.53
!43
	 The main pillars of  their mission include providing religious education of  Muslim 
women, providing arbitration, couples counseling, and encouraging khul’, the woman-
initiated practice of  dissolving a marriage. Most notably, one pillar is working to end “talaq-e-
biddat”, a term that refers to instant triple talaq. Ambar opined that the practice is “un-
Islamic” and “draconian” in a 2017 article about the Supreme Court’s plans to criminalize 
the practice.   54
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan 
	 BMMA has been at the forefront of  the movement to end instant triple talaq in India 
almost since Zakia Soman and Noorjehan Safia Niaz founded the organization in 2007. The 
name of  the organization, which translates to “Indian Muslim Women’s Movement”, is 
strategically high-register Hindi.  Some may view this as an attempt to appeal to Hindu 55
nationalists or even just moderate Hindus, but I argue that it is more likely an attempt to 
distance itself  from the Islam-oriented activist groups. Although it aims to “understand and 
ameliorate” the marginalization of  Muslim women, BMMA declares itself  as a secular 
organization.  Rather than challenging the Islamic patriarchy directly, Naish Hasan, one of  56
the founding members who is stationed in Lucknow, believes that the best approach to 
improving the standard of  living of  Muslim women is to hold the government accountable. 
 Srivastava, Anupam. "Triple Talaq: Muslim Women's Personal Law Board Slams AIMPLB for 54
Opposing Bill .” Hindustan Times. Https://www.hindustantimes.com/. December 26, 2017. https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/triple-talaq-muslim-women-personal-law-board-slams-aimplb-
for-opposing-bill/story-0ZxtanYFndyxC5hAurplJK.html.
 From a linguistic perspective, BMMA’s very Hindi name is a strong contrast to Bazm-e-Khavateen, 55
which is high-register Urdu, which has developed politically as a language exclusive to Muslim 
communities.
 "About." Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan. March 21, 2016. https://bmmaindia.com/about/.56
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The BMMA founder holds strong opinions about the legitimacy of  the clergy’s political 
leadership, including organizations like the AIMPLB, the Shia Personal Law Board and even 
the AIMWPLB. Hasan challenges the clergy’s very right to assume representation of  the 
broad Muslim community based on her democratic philosophy as she exclaims, “Who 
appointed them as leaders?…I don’t consider them as leaders of  our community. I did not 
vote for them nor did anyone else.”  57
	 Hasan believes the discrepancies in the standard of  living for Muslim men and 
women is due more to political, social and economic factors than religious ones. In fact, she 
disagrees with Shaista Ambar’s attempt to seek equality through Islamic texts, as Hasan 
opines that Muslim women’s issues are rooted in the marginalization of  the Muslim 
community as a whole. Furthermore, she claims that “the current reactionary conservative 
movement within Muslim communities, which endeavors to strengthen patriarchal values, 
has, combined with extreme poverty and marginalization, pushed Muslim women to the 
fringes of  Indian society.”   58
	 Hasan does, however, hope to set herself  aside from other secular organizations as she 
recognizes a tendency for those to address religion and religious people negatively in an effort 
to prove their secularity, which ultimately fails Muslim women who are strongly connected to 
their religious identities. This is what sets her organization apart from the rest as she straddles 
the line between secularism and religiousness, proving that secularism is not inherently anti-
religion. Hasan sees little problem in seeking intervention from the Indian government for 
matters such as instant triple talaq and the malpractice of  nikah halala. BMMA has sponsored 
 Tschalaer, 67.57
 Tschalaer, 66.58
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educational trainings on these topics to both men and women of  all religions in the general 
public. In 2016, they commissioned a report on instant triple talaq victims of  various 
socioeconomic status in six different states. That same year, they drafted the Muslim Family 
Law Act, which is essentially an amended version of  The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act of  1937, and sent it to Prime Minister Modi for consideration. The act 
explicitly stated under the section on marriage dissolution that the only acceptable form of  
triple talaq should be talaq-e-ahsan, which refers to the form of  triple talaq that takes place over 
the prolonged period of  time described in the first chapter. It is safe to say that BMMA has 
faced backlash from multiple facets of  the Muslim community, but its leadership and unique 
approach to activism have allowed the organization to push its agenda further than any other 
in the current political climate. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Nida Khan et al. 
	 Although Nida Khan established her own organization in support of  women divorced 
by instant triple talaq, she and several women just like her have made more headlines than the 
organization, collectively becoming an anomaly. In 2015, she was married off  to Sheeran 
Raza Khan, a member of  a powerful and influential Sufi family with strong connections to 
the Dargah Aala Hazrat seminary in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. Coincidentally, his uncle was 
once a member of  the AIMPLB, but cut ties as recently as 2016 over sectarian issues. After 
years of  domestic violence which ultimately caused her miscarriage, the marriage was 
dissolved when Raza Khan issued an instant triple talaq. She claimed that the instant divorce 
!46
should be held invalid in a civil court, which eventually escalated to the Supreme court which 
ruled in her favor.  
	 Khan expressed outrage at the Islamic tradition, nikah halala, that required her to 
consummate a marriage with a third party in order for her husband to remarry her. In her 
situation, Khan was forced to enter a marriage contract with a member of  the Raza Khan’s 
family fulfill the consummation requirement before this new husband could dissolve the 
marriage and Raza Khan could remarry Khan. The reason for Khan’s outrage against this 
practice is that in India, it has become common for a man to dissolve his marriage via instant 
triple talaq, regret the action and then either pay another man or find a friend or relative 
willing to marry the divorced woman and follow procedure by consummating and dissolving 
of  the marriage. Throughout this process it is common for the woman’s will and consent to 
be entirely disregarded, which was the case with Nida Khan.  
	 While Khan’s story and public statements against instant triple talaq and nikah halala 
shocked and enraged a variety of  Muslims, it was her approach to activism that turned the 
most heads. Some called for a boycott against her that entailed the denial of  a proper burial 
and acceptance in the community. One mufti even issued a fatwa against her father in which 
he called on the community to deny him entrance to any mosque for Friday prayers. 
However, many were still shocked when in August of  2017, Nida Khan announced her plans 
to join the BJP as the political party shared her fervor for abolishing instant triple talaq, nikah 
halala and polygamy.  
	 Khan had already shown support of  the BJP’s, specifically Prime Minister Modi’s, 
public condemnation of  these practices, especially when she established her nonprofit, the 
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Ala Hazrat Helping Society, which aims to support women who were victims of  these 
practices. While there are certainly Muslims who agree that these practices can be harmful to 
Muslim women and even some who wish for the Indian government to take action, it remains 
incredibly bold and unusual for a Muslim to join the BJP in this tense and violent political 
climate. Khan, however, is not entirely in a class of  her own. That same year two other 
notable figures joined this Hindu nationalist party over the same issues, Nazia Elahi Khan 
and an instant triple talaq petitioner in the Shayara Bano case of  2016 (see chapter 3), Ishrat 
Jahan. Jahan underwent instant triple talaq in 2014 when her husband called from Dubai and 
pronounced the words over the phone. 
	 Regardless of  one’s stance on instant triple talaq, it can be quite surprising to see these 
Muslim women seeking admission to the very political party that has been accused of  
sponsoring violence against Muslim communities. Thus, their decisions are symbolic of  the 
multiple facets of  Muslim women’s activism in India, and could even be indicative of  a 
growing rift, or rather, a splintering within the Muslim community as patriarchal authority 
figures continue to support those who manipulate the personal law to take advantage of  
women. This suggests that some Muslim women may harbor so little or no faith in the male-
dominated system that implements the Shariat in areas of  family law, and serves as a source 
of  authority and leadership in the social sphere of  many Muslim communities in India. 
Apparently, their faith is so diminished that it appears more promising to join the very forces 
that are considered tyrannical to the Muslim population. Perhaps, however, the decision to 
join the BJP was only meant to serve as a symbolic statement to leaders of  institutions like the 
dargahs (Sufi shrines) and dar-ul-qazas and the AIMPLB that have long been perpetuating the 
sort of  practices that Muslim women had previously expressed disapproval of  within their 
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communities, in a far less public manner. In other words, perhaps this is an attempt to be 
heard and taken more seriously by the male leaders and authorities, or perhaps it was 
absolutely a genuine act, consequential of  previous symbolic attempts to shake the patriarchy. 
Either way, it is a clear sign that there are Muslim women who are absolutely fed up with the 
male leaders in their community and are willing to cross lines to get their message heard. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Gender-Just Nikahnamas 
	 At least since the passage of  the 1986 Muslim Women’s Protection Act and the Shah 
Bano case, Muslim women’s activists have turned to nikahnamas, Islamic marriage contracts, as 
vehicles for optimizing the protections for women in a marriage, and effectively advocate 
within the Islamic court system for women’s rights. These model nikahnamas are generally 
attempts to make socio-legal reform within the broad Muslim community of  India, and often 
put pressure on the ulema and institutions like the AIMPLB rather than seeking State 
intervention.  
	 Early models produced by women’s activists in Mumbai included a hidayatnama and a 
qarar––guidelines for marriage and a pledge to adhere to the Shariat. These documents 
emphasize that the Sunna encourages arbitration and discussion in marital conflict resolution 
while viewing talaq as an absolute last resort, or that instant triple talaq is even considered 
sinful. In 2005, Uzma Naheed, one of  the women who has produced several model 
nikahnamas explained her goals: “We wanted to involve the ulema in the work and wanted a 
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solution within the framework of  [the Shariat].”  Since the nikah (official Islamic marriage) 59
ceremony is administered by the local qazi,  and thus the nikahnama is also prepared by this 60
figure, the hope is that these key individuals would incorporate gender equality and 
discourage malpractices that are harmful to women.  
	 In 2005, the AIMPLB announced its approval of  a model nikahnama that was 
originally drafted by Naheed and another leading activist in Mumbai, Flavia Agnes. The 
original document stressed that any form of  abuse and neglect were prohibited, and explicitly 
stated that a husband should not utter talaq three times in one setting. However, the version 
that was approved by the AIMPLB merely “cautioned against” a husband invoking an instant 
triple talaq. The AIMWPLB introduced a model nikahnama in 2006 featured an extensive set 
of  guidelines rooted in the Shariat, including a note that the qazi tasked with administering 
the contract and the nikah should explain to each party the stipulations established in the 
contract and the rights an obligations that come with an Islamic marriage. This model also 
stipulated the commonly accepted form of  triple talaq which takes place over a longer period 
of  time in which the husband waits a full iddat, or roughly three month period, between 
utterances of  talaq. It also included prohibitions on issuing a talaq via phone or internet at any 
time when the husband is isolated from the wife.   61
 Suneetha, A. "Muslim Women and Marriage Laws: Debating Model Nikahnama." Academia.edu. 59
https://www.academia.edu/11451702/
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 Qazis are traditionally men, although this is not a rule established in the Qur’an. In 2014, Naish 60
Hasan, founder of  BMMA made headlines throughout the country as she performed the role of  a 
qazi for a friend’s nikah.
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	 BMMA has also been supportive of  popularizing gender-just nikahnamas that prohibit 
instant triple talaq until there is a codified personal law. Although they are based in Lucknow, 
many of  the marriages officiated with these contracts have been done in Mumbai and various 
places in Gujurat. Although these organizations’ models were presented as suggestions, or 
options for the qazis to undertake, they circulated throughout and conjured much needed 
discourse within the ulema of  India about desires in the community to ensure that the rights 
given to Muslim women in the Qur’an are protected. 
	 These women’s organizations’ choice to revive the gender-just nikahnama initiative is a 
strategic one. They are using an Islamic framework as a foundation for discarding a 
husband’s right to instant divorce from within the very institution that adjudicates Muslim 
personal law and administers these marriage contracts, the dar-ul-qaza. By making pursuing 
this pathway to reform and attempting to work with the ulema and AIMPLB, these women are 
testing the willingness of  their patriarchal leadership to support gender-justice. This strategic 
move also safeguards the women’s groups from critics that would suggest they preemptively 
turned their backs on the Islamic institutions that are supposed to provide channels for 
reform. In the complicated game of  chess, this could be considered the sacrifice of  a pawn. 
The women’s effort effort to work with the ulema is represented as a move along the axis that 
symbolized the obstacles imposed by the ulema, and as a consequence they suffered a loss. The 
rejection of  gender-just nikahnamas by the AIMPLB only pushed these determined activists 
further to the gates of  the BJP-controlled Parliament.  
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❃ ❃ ❃ 
Geopolitical Considerations 
	 One feature to consider when analyzing triple-talaq focused activism is the historical 
and political significance of  its geographical hub, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. Lucknow, 
otherwise known as Nawabon ka Shahar (City of  Nawabs), is famous for its uniquely indulgent 
and extravagant culture influenced by the semi-autonomous Mughal rulers, Nawabs. These 
Nawabs functioned as a second tier of  authority the Mughal Empire that––at its peak––
reached from Kabul in present day Afghanistan to Mysore, nearly the southern-most regions 
of  the subcontinent. The dynasty of  Nawabs stationed in Lucknow, especially the final 
Nawab, Wajid Ali Shah, cultivated a legacy of  luxury and grandeur through the 
commissioning of  ornate monuments and structures like the Rumi Darvaza, the Qaiserbagh 
Palace Complex, the Bada and Chota Imambadas, massive shrines, tombs and gardens. All 
of  these feature brilliant examples of  Mughal and Islamic art and architecture, but also 
provide insight to the level of  extravagance to which each succeeding Nawab progressed.  
	 Aside from the visual spectacles the remain prominent, albeit most are crumbling and 
rather dilapidated, Lucknow was famous for its performing arts during the Mughal period. 
Some of  the most famous artists including world-class kathak dancers and singers (most of  
whom came from the courtesan tradition), musicians and poets spent their lives training and 
perfecting their craft in this magnificent Nawabon ka Shahar. The courtesans who ran the large 
and ornate kotas (royally commissioned estates and complexes in which up to hundreds of  
women would become experts in etiquette and performance art) were famous throughout the 
subcontinent, and many of  their stories were featured in the biographies and anthologies of  
emperors and British and French colonials.  
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	 Due to its proximity to powerful and influential Nawabs and the capital of  the large 
state of  Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow was a crucial locality in which the British colonial forces 
were determined to maintain a strong presence. The colonial forces worked amicably 
alongside the Nawabs for roughly a century, commissioning their own palaces and complexes 
like Firungi Mahal, University of  Lucknow, Hazratganj, The Residency, a beautiful, lush and 
green space featuring a collection of  homes, courthouses and other administrative facilities. 
Although the university and Firungi Mahal remain central to the hustle and bustle of  today’s 
Lucknow, Hazratganj and The Residency were two complexes that were historically restricted 
from Indian civilians, but also played important roles in the Indian Rebellion of  1857 in 
which the Indian army attempted to overthrow the British in a series of  mutinies, but failed 
miserably. Many Lucknowites and influential figures throughout history have tended to blame 
Nawab Wajid Ali Shah for allowing this crucial Mughal domain to fall to the British as he 
was too concerned with frivolous matters and indulgences to build a substantial resistance to 
the colonial forces.  
	 Today, the memories of  a defeated yet grand Muslim dynasty and a vicious colonial 
power are cemented in the very infrastructure of  the oldest parts of  the city, and the activist 
groups mentioned in this chapter each hold strong ties to Lucknow. Both Bazm-e-Khavateen 
and the AIMWPLB were founded in this city with the former’s office being located in Firungi 
Mahal. Shahnaz Sidrat herself  is a resident of  the neighborhood in which The Residency is 
situated, a true sign of  generational wealth. With Uttar Pradesh holding the highest 
population of  Muslims in India, and Lucknow as its capital, organizations like the AIMPLB 
and BMMA have developed a firm presence in the city as well, as one of  BMMA’s founding 
members, Naish Hasan, is stationed there. 
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	 In addition to the obvious significance of  the city’s historical context, another feature 
of  Lucknow’s political landscape is the fact that it has become the seat of  one of  the most 
powerful factions of  the BJP as the Chief  Minister of  Uttar Pradesh who is stationed there, 
Yogi Adityanath, is one of  Modi’s closest allies. Thus, whether one is traveling through the 
new or the old parts of  Lucknow, it is virtually impossible to turn any corner without being 
bombarded by BJP flags, posters and cut-outs of  Modi and Adityanath and other government 
officials with BJP. The grandiose Lok Sabha building where Members of  Parliament from 
Uttar Pradesh convene is pristine and ironically located in Hazratganj, the former British-
only district. Although Lucknow has always been home to a Hindu population as well, there 
has been a large increase in the number of  temples scattered throughout the city, especially as 
it expands, causing many of  the Muslims, who are now a minority demographic, feel further 
marginalized. Muslim neighborhoods tend to be located in the oldest corners of  the city 
where the government provides little to no resources for infrastructural improvements, 
poverty rates are higher and schools are of  dismal quality. Furthermore, the Nawab-
commissioned palaces and buildings are dilapidated and falling apart. Meanwhile, the newest 
areas like Gomti Nagar are flourishing with shopping malls, high-rise apartments, top quality 
schools and hospitals, and is home to families of  most of  the BJP officials stationed in 
Lucknow. 
	 Being aware of  these geopolitical factors are crucial for contextualizing the 
perspectives of  Muslims who fear further encroachment of  the Hindu nationalist BJP into 
their lives. Even more so, it is essential for grasping the history of  the ulema’s struggle for 
legitimacy and authority against the larger State powers, from the British to the BJP. Hence, it 
is only natural that Lucknow should serve as the arena for the fight over instant triple talaq.  
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❃ ❃ ❃ 
	 One may consider the fact that four of  the five organizations at the center of  public 
discourse on instant triple talaq have been in favor of  State intervention on the issue a simple 
and straightforward case of  women versus the patriarchy. Perhaps one may even attempt to 
pass judgment on the very framework of  Islamic law. However, their positions are far more 
complicated as each group’s relationship to the Islamic patriarchy and the Muslim population 
is vastly different. Bazm-e-Khavateen, for example, is tied to the old bourgeoisie of  Lucknow 
and strives to merge with the patriarchal All India Muslim Personal Law Board, so why would 
they take such bold opposition to their stance on instant triple talaq legislation? The All India 
Muslim Women’s Personal Law Board is an organization that stands to further develop 
personal law on the path to gender equity—using the same framework as the AIMPLB to 
interpret law. So, why would they invite a Hindu nationalist regime to meddle in this matter 
that is internal to the Muslim community? Why would BMMA work so hard to obtain the 
support of  a regime that has terrorized Muslim women? And why would women like Nida 
Khan go so far as to seek induction into the BJP? After generations of  being silenced and 
disregarded by the male leaders of  the religious community, these women are forcefully 
halting the consistent de-prioritization of  their of  their rights and safety. 
	 If  this were simply about women going against the patriarchy, then it would be 
counterproductive to bring in a regime that is equally male-dominated. If  this were simply 
about the framework of  Islamic law, or the potential for the religion itself  to uphold 
institutions that are oppressive to women, there would likely be far more secular women’s 
groups than religious-oriented women’s groups at the center of  this debate. Organizations like 
the AIMWPLB and Bazm-e-Khavateen would have far fewer supporters among Muslim 
!55
women. This, however, is about women who have been challenged with defending two sides 
of  their identities simultaneously, choosing different methods of  responding to that challenge, 
and coming together despite ideological differences to disrupt the power struggle between two 
distinct patriarchal forces for the long-awaited achievement of  a common goal.  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THE SHAYARA BANO DECISION 
Chapter Three 
	 While the leaders of  BMMA, the AIMWPLB, Bazm-e-Khavateen and the AIMPLB 
have only recently dedicated the bulk of  their efforts to debating instant triple talaq and 
propagating information on the practice, the issue has long been contentious in Muslim 
communities. Its recent hyper-politicization is largely due to the increased tensions between 
the male-dominated leadership of  Islamic institutions and the BJP-majority government. In 
between the two have stood thousands of  cases of  instant triple talaq, many remaining 
unreported while hundreds piling up in various low-level courts as women’s organizations 
have begun to gain momentum. The women’s organizations discussed in the previous chapter 
each played a vital role in establishing a space for the landmark decision of  August 2017. In 
fact BMMA even financially supported several of  the petitioners on the case. The road to the 
decision was far from linear, as there had been historical cases like that of  Shah Bano, which 
may not have focused entirely on triple talaq, but quickly became a model for how the State 
can choose to interact with Muslim personal law. It sparked such a controversy that the 
government decided to reverse the decision, ironically overruling the Supreme Court. This 
time, many women’s activist groups around the nation welcomed the State intervention, until 
the executive order of  September 2018.  This chapter will discuss the final stretch in the 
journey to outlaw instant triple talaq, and analyze the responses to the historical judicial case 
and subsequent legislation. 
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❃ ❃ ❃ 
2016-2017: Catalyzing the Movement 
 	 The nearly two years leading up to the Supreme court decision of  2017 were filled 
with public campaigns and national speaking tours sponsored by many prominent Muslim 
organizations. In 2017 BMMA published the final draft of  the Muslim Family Act, a bill they 
had been crafting for three years and had sent directly to the Prime Minister himself  in hopes 
that he would send it to Parliament. At its core, this bill aimed to codify Muslim family law in 
an attempt to eradicate the “arbitrariness and variances” in the Indian Islamic judicial 
system. While BMMA does not seem to propose any serious changes to the Muslim Marriage 
Act of  1939, they are strongly urging legislation on instant triple talaq, nikah halala, polygamy 
and the age of  marital consent. Noorjehan Safia Niaz, a co-founder of  BMMA, stated that 
the aim is to have Muslim women protected by law “Every community has their own 
marriage laws. We are also asking for one legislated law that can enable and empower us to 
raise our voice against unfair practices.”  Another member of  the organization explained the 62
Islamic basis for their drafted bill “This draft is based on the values of  equality espoused by 
the Quran and the Constitution of  India. They are in the best interests of  women and 
children.”  Additionally, there is clarification in the draft itself  of  its own foundation and 63
intentions:  
This Act, based on the values and principles of  the Qur’an as prescribed in the 
Qur’anic verses…is to consolidate, clarify and codify the provisions of  Muslim law 
 Dhanrajani, Rachna. "BMMA Releases Final Draft of  Muslim Family Law." The Hindu. 62
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and related procedure regarding Muslim marriage, divorce, maintenance during 
marriage, maintenance after divorce and widowhood, custody and maintenance of  
children and inheritance.  64
This clarification step is crucial for BMMA, as suggests that women ascribe to the same level 
of  mastery of  the Shariat and authority over Muslim personal law that has traditionally been 
exclusive to men. 
	 The draft of  this bill draws upon historical legislation on Muslim family including 
The Shariat Application Act of  1937, which made provisions for the Shariat to be applied to 
relatively all matters of  family law; The Dissolution of  Muslim Marriage Act of  1939, which 
used Maliki law create a pathway for women to end their marriages; and The Muslim 
Women’s Protection Act of  1986, which followed the Shah Bano case dealing with 
maintenance after the period of  iddat. While the drafters of  this document stated their intent 
to uphold those major pieces of  legislation, they do wish to do away with anything that could 
conflict with the statutes included in their bill. In the section V1, titled “Divorce,” the draft 
recognizes wife-initiated dissolution of  marriage (khula and faskh), husband-initiated (talaq) and 
dissolution by mutual consent (mubarah). It clarifies that wife-initiated dissolution of  marriage 
does not require the consent of  the husband, as some women are taught to believe so. It also 
specific that any triple talaq that does not involve three periods of  iddat after each talaq is “an 
invalid method of  divorce.”  65
	 While BMMA took to a more secular approach to activism and mobilization, the 
AIMWPLB and Bazm-e-Khavateen sought to challenge the ulema directly and mobilize in 
 BMMA India, "Muslim Family Law – Draft Sent to the PM." Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan. 64
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religious spaces. By touring the country and holding gatherings in mosques, meeting with 
members of  the AIMPLB and prominent scholars in the ulema, Naish Hasan of  BMMA and 
Shahnaz Sidrat of  the AIMWPLB took very similar approaches to seek the prohibition of  
instant triple talaq. Meanwhile, the AIMPLB and members of  the ulema, even on occasion 
Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, an organization that dates back to colonial India and often remains 
silent on politics, hosted lectures and meetings at religiously significant sites, mainly in Delhi 
and Lucknow, partly to preach the technical legitimacy of  instant triple talaq according to 
Hanafi law, but most importantly, to warn against State-interference in personal law. 
❃ ❃ ❃ 
The Oﬃcial Judgement 
	 In 2017 a Sikh, a Christian, a Parsi, a Hindu, and a Muslim Supreme Court judge 
took to the bench to determine whether or not the instant triple talaq declared by Shayara 
Bano’s husband would be voided. In the case, Bano and four other victims of  instant divorce 
whose petitions were attached to hers all challenged the constitutionality of  the practice as 
well as its legitimacy within Muslim personal law. They argued, with the support of  BMMA, 
that the practice violated their fundamental rights according to Articles 14, 15 and 21 of  the 
Indian Constitution as it was “arbitrary and discriminatory.”  This was quickly recognized as 66
the most important Supreme Court case on Muslim marriage laws since the Shah Bano case 
of  1985,  which was notably decided by a majority Hindu bench.  67
 Herklotz, Tanja. "Shayara Bano versus Union of  India and Others. The Indian Supreme Court's 66
Ban of  Triple Talaq and the Debate around Muslim Personal Law and Gender Justice." VRÜ 
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 50, no. 3 (2018): 300-311.
 Recall from the first chapter that this case solidified two pathways for the State’s relationship with 67
religion: either personal law would precede the Constitution, or be subjected to it.
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	 Bano and the four petitioners involved in the case invoked the Universal Declaration 
of  Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and 
the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women in their 
argument. They claimed instant triple talaq was not only a nonessential and discouraged 
practice in Islam, but a practice that is considered inhumane by various forums and doctrines 
on human rights like the Hindu practice of  sati was considered upon its outlawing. The fact 
that instant divorce had been banned in over twenty Muslim-majority countries, most of  
which invoke the Shariat in their lawmaking, supported these petitioner’s claim that instant 
triple talaq was nonessential to Islam. 
	 The case was originally brought on by Bano, who had been abused by her husband, 
Rizwan Ahmad, and other members of  his family with whom they shared a home. Since the 
beginning of  their marriage, Ahmad had been demanding Bano’s father to pay a higher 
dowry, for which he did not have the means. Bano claims she “was tortured and physically 
abused by the respondent and his family. She was often beaten and kept hungry in a closed 
room for day.”  Bano claims that she was also drugged on multiple occasions. On one in 68
particular, in 2015, she was driven out to the city of  Moradabad, which is roughly an eleven-
hour drive from the city of  Allahabad, Ahmad’s home. The husband demanded that Bano’s 
parents either deliver five lakh (500,000 Indian Rupees) or take their daughter back. 
According to reports, Bano was in such a state that it she would have certainly died if  Ahmad 
was to abandon her, as he had threatened, in Moradabad. The parents, who had very little 
money to begin with, came to collect their daughter and brought her home with them to 
Kashipur, Uttarakhand.  
 Shayara Bano vs. Union of  India and Others (August 22, 2017), 6.68
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	 Over the course of  four months, Ahmad made several visits to Kashipur in attempts 
to persuade Bano and the children, who had also been brought to Kashipur, to return to their 
matrimonial home in Allahabad. After he convinced Bano’s parents to return the children, 
Bano herself  still refused, and Ahmad filed for a restoration of  conjugal rights at the Family 
Court of  Allahabad. He was filing for his right to have access to his wife, under his roof, after 
he had beaten and drugged her and given her parents the ultimatum to pay a higher dowry 
or take her back. After Bano brought her complaints about the extreme abuse to the judge, 
Ahmad retracted his plea for restoration of  conjugal rights and issued an instant divorce. 
Bano, however, was not even present at the time. In a letter to her on October 10, 2015, six 
months after she had returned to her parent’s home, Ahmad completely denied the claims 
Bano had made about abuse, and blamed Bano for any physical harm that was done for her. 
He wrote that she had been threatening to falsely implicate him in threats to inflict injury 
upon herself  and consume poison, and for those reasons he was “regretful” to issue an instant 
divorce in the presence of  two marginal witnesses (neither of  whom were even related to 
Bano).  This left Bano in an immediate state of  financial distress, as she had been 69
unemployed for several years and her father could not earn enough to support her and her 
two children. 
	 According to the official 2017 judgement written by Judge Jagdish Singh Khehar, the 
Supreme Court panel decided “at the very outset…to limit the instant consideration, to ‘talaq-
e-biddat’––triple talaq.”  Understanding that this would have a monumental impact on the 70
Muslim community, the five judges took their time to study the various methods of  marriage 
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dissolution under Hanafi law, especially the differences between talaq-e-ahsan and talaq-e-biddat. 
They referred to several passages from the Qur’an, notably surah two, verses 224 through 228:  
And make not God’s (name) an excuse in your oaths against doing good, or acting 
rightly, or making peace between persons, for God is one who hearth and knoweth all 
things. God will not call you to account for thoughtlessness in your oaths, but for the 
intention in your hearts and he is of-forgiving, Most Merciful. For those who take an 
oath for abstention from their wives, a waiting for four months is ordained; if  then 
they return, God is oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. But if  their intention is firm for 
divorce, God heareth And knoweth all things. Divorced women shall wait concerning 
themselves for three monthly periods. Nor is it lawful for them to hide what God hath 
created in their wombs, if  they have faith in God and the Last Day. And their 
husbands have the better right to take them back In that period, if  they wish for 
reconciliation. And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them, 
according to what is equitable; but men have a degree (of  advantage) over them and 
God is exalted in power Wise.”   71
Kehar explains that the Judges interpreted these verses in a way that values contemplation 
and thoughtfulness on behalf  of  the husband when there are conflicts between him and his 
wife, and inherently disapprove of  impulsive decisions that lead to talaq: 
The above ‘verses’ caution husbands to understand, that an oath in the name of  God 
was not a valid excuse – since God looks at intention, and not mere thoughtless 
words. It is in these circumstances, that ‘verses’ 226 and 227 postulate, that the 
husband and wife in a difficult 18 relationship, are allowed a period of  four months, 
to determine whether an adjustment is possible. Even though reconciliation is 
recommended, but if  the couple is against reconciliation, the Quran ordains, that it is 
unfair to keep the wife tied to her husband indefinitely. The Quran accordingly 
suggests, that in such a situation, divorce is the only fair and equitable course. All the 
same it is recognized, that divorce is the most hateful action, in the sight of  the God.   72
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It is here that the Court relates its understanding of  the legitimacy of  instant divorce within 
the Shariat to verses that applaud patience and thoughtfulness as well as good intentions in 
husbands wishing to divorce their wives. Thus, the panel of  Supreme Court Justices came to 
the conclusion that instant triple talaq was a practice that, on the basis of  its abruptness, was 
despised in the Qur’an. This idea justified their determination that it was not an essential part 
of  religious expression. Furthermore, the Hanafi school, and every other major school for 
that matter, condemned instant triple talaq, viewing it as being barely permissible, or even 
sinful. This pushed the Court towards a decision that no remarkable harm would occur unto 
Muslims in India if  the practice were to be declared unconstitutional due to its violation of  
rights established under the Indian Constitution that should protect women from such 
“arbitrary” harm.  
❃ ❃ ❃ 
Parliament and Modi 

	 When the decision to ban instant triple talaq came down from the Supreme Court in 
August of  2017, the both national and international media had a field day. Several weeks 
later, Parliament turned the decision into legislation, solidifying the unlawful status of  instant 
divorce. Nearly every major news source in the West immediately saw this as a victory for 
Muslim women, although very few understood the decades of  activism and sociopolitical 
circumstances that allowed the decision to come through. Indian media generally saw it as a 
success story as well, but what I noticed in my travels in North India whether I was speaking 
with middle class or lower class Muslim women, the landmark decision was a clear cause for 
concern. Many Muslims women, often regardless of  how they felt about instant triple talaq, it 
was disconcerting that a government who had been enabling and directing the terrorizing 
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and of  Muslim people was boldly intervening in personal law. For many it raised the question, 
what will they do next?  
	 Later, in September of  2018, after the Supreme Court’s decision was followed up by 
the official ordinance, Prime Minister Modi announced an executive order that would make 
instant triple talaq a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in jail. This legislation, 
which was well received by the BMMA, was perhaps unsettling for a broader faction of  the 
Muslim community, and certainly for members of  the ulema and the AIMPLB. In an op-ed 
written by The Telegraph, a widely read Indian newspaper among the upper class, the editorial 
board reflected the views of  many as they questioned the justification of  the new ordinance:  
Any form of  divorce is a civil matter; the bill turned it into a crime by proposing three 
years of  prison for any man who pronounced instant triple talaq. A crime such as 
rioting can attract three years’ imprisonment, while causing death by negligence can 
attract two. The disproportionate penalty is deliberate, as is the criminalisation, which 
is only permitted when the legislature finds that an act can cause ‘harm’ to the public. 
Any form of  divorce is a civil matter; the bill turned it into a crime by proposing three 
years of  prison for any man who pronounced instant triple talaq. A crime such as 
rioting can attract three years’ imprisonment, while causing death by negligence can 
attract two. The disproportionate penalty is deliberate, as is the criminalisation, which 
is only permitted when the legislature finds that an act can cause ‘harm’ to the 
public.  73
Activists like Flavia Agnes, along with other members of  the ulema and the AIMPLB, have 
raised similar arguments, claiming that there is no substantial justification for criminalization 
if  the act is considered ineffective.  
	 The executive order was supported by Amit Shah, President of  the BJP and Yogi 
Adityanath, Chief  Minister of  Uttar Pradesh––two of  the most senior members of  the BJP. 
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For nearly a year prior to the executive order, the ordinance for criminalization was under 
consideration in Parliament, but faced strong opposition and gridlock in the upper house, 
Rajya Sabha, which prompted Modi’s executive order. The ordinance has remained in Rajya 
Sabha, and experts doubt it will prevail, which means the criminalization of  instant divorce 
could expire with Modi’s executive order.  
	 The obstacles that Modi is facing in overseeing the success of  the ordinance for 
criminalization is perhaps a sign of  hope for those who fear a parliament that is 
overwhelmingly in favor of  excessive and unwelcome interference with personal law. 
However,  because of  Modi’s commitment to achieving his personal goals and his history of  
ignoring legal restrictions, any Muslim who realizes that the legitimacy of  a centralized 
cultural and religious institution is at risk of  being compromised (if  it has not been already) 
lives in constant fear. For Muslim women playing the game of  shatranj, the victory over instant 
triple talaq may have meant the advancement of  their queen, but the cost is their defense; for, 
now all that has not yet been sacrificed is vulnerable to the State and its patriarchy.  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Conclusion 
	 In this paper, I approached the discussion of  current Indian government’s 
involvement in Muslim personal law by providing social, political and historical context for 
which the most recent landmark Supreme Court decision was passed. In doing so, I also 
provided an analysis of  the nuances in Muslim women’s activism, the origins of  the various 
groups and their approaches to activism in general, and with instant triple talaq specifically. 
Each of  these factors lend themselves to two larger, more complicated issues. The first issue is 
what ultimately lies at the core of  any of  these debates and movements related to Muslim 
personal law and the State, and that is the relationship between the democratic State and its 
religious minorities. The second is concerned with the current gender politics within the 
broad Muslim community, mainly the Islamic institutions like the AIMPLB and the ulema. 
This is central to the question I had originally set out to answer in this research endeavor. 
	 In the beginning, I briefly discussed some of  the perils of  being a Muslim living under 
a Hindu nationalist government: the rapes, the kidnappings, public flogging, innocent people 
being set on fire and murdered for suspicion of  carrying beef, the challenges of  renting an 
apartment or finding a job. Yet, the BJP was committed to “ensuring quality and dignity for 
Muslim women” as Amit Shah, President of  the political party tweeted in December 2018.  74
Party leadership dedicated their efforts to embracing the savior role, just as the British 
 Shah, Chowkidar Amit. "Congratulations to PM Modi Ji and the Entire Govt for Successfully 74
Passing the Triple Talaq Bill in Lok Sabha. This Is a Historic Step Ensuring Equality and Dignity for 
the Muslim Women. Congress and Other Parties Must Apologise for Decades of  Injustice towards 
Muslim Women." Twitter. December 27, 2018. https://twitter.com/AmitShah/status/
1078291545244065793?ref_src=twsrc^tfw|twcamp^tweetembed|
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colonial forces did in their civilizing mission, and often blamed the Congress Party, the 
previous majority, for “injustice towards Muslim women.” But every “savior” must face 
obstacles, so PM Modi made persistent efforts to highlight his struggle to “save” these Muslim 
women. In one Economic Times article he said, “Despite all hurdles and opposition from 
hardliners and opposition parties, the government is committed to making a law on triple 
talaq.”  Hopefully the parallels I’ve drawn between the BJP and the British Raj have made 75
established significant clues as to why the same political party that is inciting such violence 
and further marginalizing Muslims in India would fight so hard to outlaw a practice that 
would greatly benefit Muslim women. 
	 Just as the British cloaked their ulterior motives to gain control of  the people of  the 
subcontinent in their “civilizing” mission to “save” Indian women from Indian men, the BJP 
is feigning an attempt to “save” Muslim women from Muslim men for similar reasons. We’ve 
already witnessed a range of  attempts to erase Muslim identity and history on a superficial 
level, by changing the names of  cities like Allahabad and Faizabad, declaring monuments 
and structures built by Muslim rulers as foreign and treacherous to India’s Hindu roots. The 
widespread murders and rapes carried out by Hindu nationalists that have plagued Muslim 
populations in regions across the country, and have been politicized and justified as patriotic 
or religiously motivated. And even the economic and social disenfranchisement and 
discrimination as Muslims find it increasingly challenging to seek employment, purchase 
homes and rent apartments, or just live peacefully in areas with large Hindu populations. 
 "Prime Minister Modi Ensured Triple Talaq Has No Place in Country: Amit Shah." The Economic 75
Times. October 15, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/prime-
minister-modi-ensured-triple-talaq-has-no-place-in-country-amit-shah/articleshow/66221273.cms. 
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Given this context, it is reasonable for one to be suspicious of  Prime Minister Modi’s efforts 
to support Muslim women.  
	 If  it was not already clear, Modi’s executive order to criminalize instant triple talaq 
despite considerable opposition displays a commitment to further oppressing this large 
minority and cripple its communities. Muslim feminists and activists from Mumbai to 
Lucknow argued that criminalizing a practice that is already considered void and 
meaningless, seems excessive. Furthermore, if  the men attempting to instantly divorce their 
wives are thrown in jail, the financial burden to provide for themselves and their family will 
be yet again abruptly place on the wife. Then, there is the potential for women to fear 
reporting cases of  instant triple talaq for fear that their inlaws or community members may 
attempt to seek vengeance in some way for their husband’s imprisonment. Thus, this second 
piece of  legislation does not actually do anything more than persuade Muslim women, 
especially those of  lower socioeconomic status with less resources and agency, against 
reporting instant triple talaq.  
	 Given the severity of  the violence and discrimination Muslims have experienced, 
especially since the BJP became Parliament’s ruling party, many are already concerned for the 
future plans of  this government to use its moral agenda or women’s empowerment scheme to 
further intervene in personal law and other aspects of  Islamic tradition and culture. It 
appears that Muslim women’s agency in the banning of  instant triple talaq in 2017 opened 
the gateway for future State intervention in Muslim personal law. The undue criminalization 
of  instant divorce proved to be the first instance of  the anticipated overstepping of  the State’s 
previously stipulated boundaries.  
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	 Lastly, I believe it speaks volumes to the gravity of  the abuse Muslim women have 
endured in India for decades at the hands of  leaders and patriarchal institutions who use 
haphazard personal laws to perpetuate misogyny that these women would publicly seek 
support from a violent Hindu-nationalist regime. The women who are running and 
supporting groups like BMMA, AIMWPLB and Bazm-e-Khavateen are aware of  the risks 
they are taking by inviting the State to interfere with Muslim personal law, they have not been 
blind to the cruelty of  the BJP and the Hindu nationalist movement. However, they 
continued to urge Parliament to pass the historical legislation to outlaw instant triple talaq, 
while male-dominated groups like the ulema and the AIMPLB remained firm in their support 
of  this practice which has already been deemed illegitimate and illegal in over twenty 
Muslim-majority countries. The dilemma of  choosing between womanhood and religious, 
ethnic or indigenous identities is one that women around the world and throughout history 
have experienced one way or another. In this case, the Muslim Indian women referred to by 
some newspapers as “triple talaq crusaders” or simply just supporters of  the 2017 Supreme 
Court decision, seem to have made a surprising choice in prioritizing womanhood over 
religious identity.  
	 What is perhaps most significant, or telling of  a major transition in gender politics, is 
Bazm-e-Khavateen’s commitment to supporting the 2017 Supreme Court decision 2017 
legislation. This is an organization that has not only been committed to distancing itself  from 
secular activism since its founding in 1934, but whose current leadership has been adamant 
about supporting the ulema and the AIMPLB. Director Shahnaz Sidrat has gone so far as to 
express a desire to be included in the AIMPLB as the organization’s women’s wing, yet her 
and her constituents were firm in their condemnation of  instant triple talaq and welcoming to 
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the Supreme Court’s decision. This type of  ideological shift is indicative of  a major rift along 
gendered lines within the large and diverse Muslim community of  India. It tells us that there 
is an entire class of  Muslim women may be considered conservative, but are thoroughly 
disappointed by if  not splenetic towards the adjudicators of  Muslim personal law and the 
male-dominated leadership of  that is guilty of  perpetuating the usage of  such a contested and 
abusive custom. 
	 Moving forward, this period will signify a shift in Indian political history as the 
government marches firmly in the direction of  minimizing the space previously allotted by 
legislation from the colonial period (Shariat Application Act of  1937) for Muslims to conduct 
their affairs by both State laws and personal law for family matters. If  the Supreme Court’s 
decision on the Shayara Bano case was not enough to signify this, Modi’s executive order 
represents a commitment to asserting dominance and power over the Muslims in the country 
by overtaking the authorities on Muslim personal law. Although a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) 
has been at the center of  public discourse for generations, especially since the early 1980s 
when the Hindu nationalist movement really took off. Many Muslim activists and public 
figures including Flavia Agnes and leaders of  Bazm-e-Khavateen, AIMPLB and AIMWPLB 
have stood against the UCC for fear of  an overbearing bias towards Hinduism and Hindu 
personal laws. Thus, Modi and the Supreme Court’s stances on instant triple talaq sound off  
an alarm for Muslims throughout India amongst various classes, regardless of  whether or not 
they detested the evolution of  triple talaq into an instantaneous practice, or even if  they were 
even uninterested in or unaware of  the issue. 
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❃ ❃ ❃ 
Further Research  
	 While this paper covered most of  the factors contributing to the triple talaq 
controversy and multiple perspectives on the issue, there is certainly room to develop the 
research even further. Two issues that are most deserving of  further research are the nuances 
in public opinion on instant triple talaq and State legislation that interferes with Muslim 
personal law as well as a comparison of  Modi and the BJP’s attitude towards the 
advancement of  Hindu women’s rights and protections as Hindu personal law comes into 
conflict with State law. Due to the time and resource restraints of  this project, these two 
elements were scarcely discussed as they require either interviews with human subjects or in 
depth research into gender-based discrimination and recent women’s activism within the 
Hindu community. 
	 During the nine months I spent in Lucknow I developed relationships with Muslim 
women of  various socioeconomic backgrounds––from those with generational wealth and 
relation to royalty in the region, to those of  a middle class, yet secure, household and those 
who lived in the outskirts of  the city in close-knit poor and underserved communities. At 
times we would sit in a cozy and safe-feeling corner of  the home, whether it was a bungalow 
or a single room divided by curtains, and I would listen and learn from their stories, discuss 
their concerns and their hopes for the near future as well as future generations. What I began 
to notice is that lower class women seemed far more concerned for their safety and their 
future hardships as the Supreme Court decision sounded off  an alarm for their communities 
that were already the most vulnerable to violence incited by Hindu nationalists. Meanwhile 
many middle class women––if  they were at all interested––expressed more relief  for the 
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decision, along with the upperclass. My hypothesis is that the priorities shift along class lines 
due to the fact that Hindu nationalism manifests differently along class lines with the lower 
classes experiencing violence on a more direct and regular basis, which causing Muslim 
women of  this demographic to prioritize the exclusion of  the BJP from their personal 
matters. 
	 Lastly, this project does little to compare the State’s response to Muslim and Hindu 
women’s issues regarding rights and safety, and an in-depth research project on this topic 
could add great value to the scholarly discourse. In 2018 the Supreme Court decided against 
the banning of  women from the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala. The justification for refusing 
women’s admission into this temple is historically based in religious doctrine, yet the Prime 
Minister expressed a different attitude towards the issue than he did towards instant triple 
talaq, referring to the Hindu custom as a matter of  “tradition” and the Muslim one of, 
“gender equality.”  A further look into the government’s treatment of  Hindu women’s 76
activist groups and Hindu laws that are detrimental to women’s wellbeing could facilitate a 
more comprehensive understanding of  the State’s relationship with religious minorities such 
as Muslims as well as provide a more extensive critique of  the current regime’s political 
strategies that use women’s empowerment as an avenue for fulfilling ulterior motives.  
 ANI | Updated: Jan 1, 2019. "Triple Talaq a Matter of  Gender Equality, Sabarimala Is about 76
Tradition: PM Modi | India News - Times of  India." The Times of  India. May 09, 2019. https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/triple-talaq-a-matter-of-gender-equality-sabarimala-is-about-
tradition-pm-modi/articleshow/67337349.cms.
!73
Bibliography 
Abbasi, Zubair, and Muhammad. "Islamic Law and Social Change: An Insight into the 
Making of  Anglo-Muhammadan Law." OUP Academic. June 19, 2014. https://
academic.oup.com/jis/article-abstract/25/3/325/2963150?
redirectedFrom=fulltext.Ahmad, Irfan. Islamism and Democracy in India the 
Transformation of  Jamaat-e-Islami. Permanent Black, 2013.  
"About." Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan. March 21, 2016. https://bmmaindia.com/
about/. 
Afp. "How India's 2002 Gujarat Riots Unfolded." Dawn. June 17, 2016. https://
www.dawn.com/news/1265474. 
Ahmed, K. N. The Muslim Law of  Divorce. New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 2006. 
Ali, Kecia. "Islamic Marriage." In The Islamic Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family 
Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. 
All India Muslim Personal Law Board. http://www.aimplboard.in/important-
resolutions.php. Translated by author.  
ANI | Updated: Jan 1, 2019. "Triple Talaq a Matter of  Gender Equality, Sabarimala Is 
about Tradition: PM Modi | India News - Times of  India." The Times of  India. 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/triple-talaq-a-matter-of-gender-equality-
sabarimala-is-about-tradition-pm-modi/articleshow/67337349.cms.  
Aslam, Maulana Ejaz Ahmad. “Triple Talaq and Muslims.” All India Muslim Personal Law 
Board. 2 Dec. 2016. 
“Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan Seeks Comments of  Concerned Citizens on the Draft of  
the Proposed Muslim Family Law.” BMMA India, 8 Sept. 2017. 
"BJP Lawmaker: Taj Mahal Will Soon Become 'Tej Mandir'." Dhaka Tribune. February 05, 
2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/2018/02/05/bjp-lawmaker-
taj-mahal-will-soon-become-tej-mandir. 
BMMA India, "Muslim Family Law – Draft Sent to the PM." Bharatiya Muslim Mahila 
Andolan. January 01, 2016. https://bmmaindia.com/2016/01/01/muslim-family-
law-draft-sent-to-the-pm-2/. 
BMMA India. "इस्लाम में औरत को तलाक का अिधकार." Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan. 
January 03, 2016. https://bmmaindia.com/2016/01/03/इस्लाम-में-औरत-को-तलाक-का-
अ/ 
Board, The Editorial. "Why the Rush to Criminalise Triple Talaq?" Telegraph India. 
September 24, 2018. https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/many-birds/cid/
1669911. 
!74
Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2007. 
Correspondent, Special. “Muslim Women Are Partners in Development Process.” The Hindu. 
May 13, 2010. https://www.thehindu.com/news/ldquoMuslim-women-are-partners-
in-development-processrdquo/article16300543.ece. 
Das, Soumya. “Triple Talaq Petitioner Ishrat Jahan Joins BJP.” The Hindu. January 01, 2018. 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/triple-talaq-petitioner-ishrat-jahan-joins-
bjp/article22342063.ece.  
Dissolution of  Muslim Marriages Act (1939). 
Edappagath, Kauser. Divorce and Gender Equity in Muslim Personal Law of  India. LexisNexis, 2014. 
Engineer, Asghar Ali. The Shah Bano Controversy. London: Sangam, 1987.  
Feeds, ANI. “AIMWPLB Hails Cabinet for Clearing Triple Talaq Bill.” India.com. December 
15, 2017. https://www.india.com/news/agencies/aimwplb-hails-cabinet-for-clearing-
triple-talaq-bill-2756827/. 
France-Presse, Agence. "India Makes Islamic 'triple-talaq' Instant Divorce Punishable by up 
to Three Years in Prison." The Telegraph. September 19, 2018. https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/19/india-makes-islamic-triple-talaq-instant-
divorce-punishable/. 
Hallaq, Wael B. “The Law in the Age of  Nation-states.” in Introduction to Islamic Law. 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.  
Hassan, Riffat. “A Muslim's Perspective on Global Ethics and Cultural Diversity.” The Power 
of  Culture, Nov. 1996. 
"Have Asked Qazis to Include No-triple Talaq Clause in Marriages: AIMPLB to Supreme 
Court." The Economic Times. May 23, 2017. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/
news/politics-and-nation/social-boycott-aimplbs-new-measure-against-triple-talaq/
articleshow/58793082.cms. 
 Herklotz, Tanja. “Shayara Bano versus Union of  India and Others. The Indian Supreme 
Court's Ban of  Triple Talaq and the Debate around Muslim Personal Law and 
Gender Justice.” VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 50, no. 3 (2018): 300-311. 
"Home | All India Muslim Women Personal Law Board." Home | All India Muslim Women 
Personal Law Board. https://www.aimwplb.com/. 
"Indian Politician: 'Taj Mahal Built by Traitors'." BBC News. October 16, 2017. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41635770. 
Ingber, Sasha. "India Makes Instant Divorce A Criminal Offense." NPR. September 19, 
2018. https://www.npr.org/2018/09/19/649514458/india-makes-instant-divorce-a-
criminal-offense. 
!75
Iyengar, Radhika. "What Is Nikah Halala, How It Was Established and Where It Stands in 
Modern India." The Indian Express. March 26, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/
article/what-is/what-is-nikah-halala-how-it-was-established-and-where-it-stands-in-
modern-india-triple-talaq-4618415/. 
“Joint Press Statement of  Scheduled Tribes, Nomadic Tribes, Scheduled Castes, Lingayats, 
Buddhist, Other Backward Communities & Muslims against Uniform Civil Code.” 
Aimplboard.in, 20 Oct. 2016.  
Kidwai, Qutub Jehan. "A Step Forward: Women's Outfit Set to Challenge Mullah's Might."  
no. 4, September 2010. 
“Letter to the Law Commission of  India.” Aimplboard.in, 31 July 2018.  
"Lynch Mobs, ‘Cow Vigilantes’ and Whatsapp: What Hate Looks like in India.” The 
Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/reports-of-
hate-crime-cases-have-spiked-in-india/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.41956db44d76. 
Malhotra, Jyoti. "Triple Talaq: From Shah Bano to Shayara Bano." The Indian Express. August 
22, 2017. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/triple-talaq-verdict-supreme-
court-illegal-muslim-divorce-nikah-halala-from-shah-bano-to-shayara-
bano-4808525/. 
Manjari Mishra | TNN | Updated: Aug 19, 2010. "Women Outfit Set to Challenge Mullahs' 
Might | Lucknow News - Times of  India." The Times of  India (TOI). May 10, 2019. 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/Women-outfit-set-to-challenge-
mullahs-might/articleshow/6333420.cms. 
Mannathukkaren, Nissim. “The Fast Disappearing Muslim in the Indian Republic.” The 
Indian Express, 22 Jan. 2018, indianexpress.com/article/opinion/the-fast-disappearing-
muslim-in-the-indian-republic-bjp-mla-hindu-saffron-religion-5034205/. 
Minault, Gail. “Women, Legal Reform, and Muslim Identity.” Comparative Studies of  South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 2 (1997): 1-10.  
Mohammad Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano Begum and Others (April 23, 1985). 
“Muslim Family Law — Draft Sent to the PM.” BMMA India, 1 Jan. 2016.  
NewIndianXpress. "Bareilly Court Declares Nida Khan's Talaq Invalid, Orders Probe into 
Domestic Violence.” The New Indian Express. http://www.newindianexpress.com/
nation/2018/jul/18/bareilly-court-declares-nida-khans-talaq-invalid-orders-probe-
into-domestic-violence-1845224.html. 
NewsX. "Cover Story Special: Triple Talaq - Then and Now." YouTube. August 26, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sNgyGpL_Nhg&feature=youtu.be. 
Niaz, Noorjehan Safia, and Zakia Soman. No More “Talaq Talaq Talaq” — Muslim Women 
Call for a Ban on an UnIslamic Practice. Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, 2015, 
No More “Talaq Talaq Talaq” — Muslim Women Call for a Ban on an UnIslamic 
Practice.  
!76
Patel, Girish. "Narendra Modi's One-Day Cricket: What and Why?" Economic and Political 
Weekly 37, no. 48 (2002): 4826-837. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/
stable/4412905. 
Press Trust of  India. "India's Muslim Neighbours among 23 Countries That Have Banned 
Triple Talaq." Hindustan Times. September 19, 2018. https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-muslim-neighbours-among-23-
countries-that-have-banned-triple-talaq/story-J8b9HkOCwdMAIWyscwxZMK.html. 
Press Trust of  India. "Kathua Rape Victim Was Sexually Assaulted, Died of  Asphyxia: 
Doctors Tell Court." Hindustan Times. September 09, 2018. https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kathua-rape-victim-was-sexually-assaulted-
died-of-asphyxia-doctors-tell-court/story-4nOgLfG4v65R6ZAPJA93UI.html. 
"Prime Minister Modi Ensured Triple Talaq Has No Place in Country: Amit Shah." The 
Economic Times. October 15, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/
politics-and-nation/prime-minister-modi-ensured-triple-talaq-has-no-place-in-
country-amit-shah/articleshow/66221273.cms. 
Priyangi Agarwal. "Now, women protest against Nida Khan for defaming clerics family". The 
Times of  India (TOI). January 4, 2017 Wednesday. https://advance-lexis-
com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:
5MJ8-FK31-JB3N-T4S6-00000-00&context=1516831. 
Priyangi Agarwal. "Triple talaq: UP Minorities Commission to probe fatwa against Nida 
Khan". The Times of  India (TOI). July 19, 2018 Thursday. https://advance-lexis-
com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:
5STX-3M21-DXJR-H2FT-00000-00&context=1516831. 
Sherman, Taylor C. Muslim Belonging in Secular India: Negotiating Citizenship in Postcolonial 
Hyderabad. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Pti. "Narendra Modi Sad about 2002 Riots but No Regrets, Says Biography." India Today. 
March 25, 2014. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/narendra-modi-2002-
gujarat-riots-narendra-modi-a-political-biography-harper-collins-186246-2014-03-25. 
“Reinvention of Communal Identities and Implications for Democracy :” Economic and Political 
Weekly, 14 Aug. 2013.  
"Religion Census 2011." Religion Data - Population of  Hindu / Muslim / Sikh / Christian - 
Census 2011 India. https://www.census2011.co.in/religion.php. 
Saberin, Zeenat. "India: Triple Talaq or Instant Divorce Now a Criminal Offense." India 
News | Al Jazeera. September 19, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/
india-triple-talaq-instant-divorce-criminal-offence-180919073349658.html. 
Saldanha, Alison. "2017: The Year Of  Hate Crime." IndiaSpend. September 12, 2018. 
https://www.indiaspend.com/2017-the-year-of-hate-crime-10632/. 
!77
Saxena, Saumya. "The Triple Talaq Bill: A Mediocre Legislation and a Missed Opportunity." 
The Indian Express. January 09, 2018. https://indianexpress.com/article/gender/
the-triple-talaq-bill-a-mediocre-legislation-and-a-missed-opportunity-5017088/. 
Shah, Chowkidar Amit. "Congratulations to PM Modi Ji and the Entire Govt for Successfully 
Passing the Triple Talaq Bill in Lok Sabha. This Is a Historic Step Ensuring Equality 
and Dignity for the Muslim Women. Congress and Other Parties Must Apologise for 
Decades of  Injustice towards Muslim Women." Twitter. December 27, 2018. https://
twitter.com/AmitShah/status/1078291545244065793?ref_src=twsrc^tfw|
twcamp^tweetembed|twterm^1078291545244065793&ref_url=https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/congress-must-apologise-for-injustice-to-muslim-
women-amit-shah-as-ls-pass-triple-talaq-bill/articleshow/67275770.cms. 
Shamim Ara vs. State of  UP & Anr (October 1, 2002). 
Sharda, Shailvee, and Tnn. “Muslim Women Personal Law Board: Muslim Women's 
Personal Law Board Welcomes SC Triple Talaq Verdict | India News - Times of  
India.” The Times of  India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/muslim-
women-personal-law-board-welcomes-sc-triple-talaq-verdict/articleshow/
60170859.cms. 
"Shayara Bano vs Union of  India - Triple Talaq - Case Summary." Law Times Journal. April 
02, 2019. https://lawtimesjournal.in/triple-talaq/. 
Shayara Bano vs. Union of  India and Others (August 22, 2017). 
Shehadeh, Lamia Rustum. The Idea of  Women in Fundamentalist Islam. University Press of  
Florida, 2007.  
Singh, Prabhat. "Interview With Indian 'Instant Divorce' Victim Nida Khan." The Diplomat. 
September 27, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/interview-with-indian-
instant-divorce-victim-nida-khan/. 
Spivak, G. C. Can the Subaltern Speak?Colbert B., 1998. 
Srivastava, Anupam. "Triple Talaq: Muslim Women's Personal Law Board Slams AIMPLB 
for Opposing Bill ." Hindustan Times. December 26, 2017. https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/triple-talaq-muslim-women-personal-law-
board-slams-aimplb-for-opposing-bill/story-0ZxtanYFndyxC5hAurplJK.html. 
Staff, Scroll. "Clerics Should Not Create Hurdles for Triple Talaq Law, Says Muslim 
Women's Personal Law Board." Scroll. December 26, 2017. https://scroll.in/latest/
862829/clerics-should-not-create-hurdles-for-triple-talaq-law-says-muslim-womens-
personal-law-board. 
Suneetha, A. "Muslim Women and Marriage Laws: Debating Model Nikahnama." 
Academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/11451702/
Muslim_women_and_Marriage_Laws_Debating_Model_Nikahnama. 
“Teen Talaq Par Pabandi Ke Liye Qanoon Saazi Sharifat Mein Khuli Mudakhilat.”All India 
Muslim Personal Law Board, November 23, 2017.  
!78
"The All India Muslim Personal Law Board Continues to Be Regressive." The Wire. https://
thewire.in/religion/all-india-muslim-personal-law-board-regressive. 
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, § II (1937). 
"Timeline of  the Riots in Modi's Gujarat." The New York Times. April 06, 2014. https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/06/world/asia/modi-gujarat-riots-
timeline.html#/#time287_8514. 
Tnn. "Panel of  Muftis to Probe Charges against Tauqeer Raza after Deoband Meet | 
Bareilly News - Times of  India." The Times of  India. May 09, 2019. https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/Panel-of-muftis-to-probe-charges-against-
Tauqeer-Raza-after-Deoband-meet/articleshow/52273236.cms. 
Tnn. "Nida Khan: Anti-triple Talaq Crusader Nida Khan to Join BJP | Bareilly News - 
Times of  India." The Times of  India. May 10, 2019. https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/bareilly-anti-triple-talaq-crusader-nida-
khan-to-join-bjp/articleshow/65345226.cms. 
Tnn. "Panel of  Muftis to Probe Charges against Tauqeer Raza after Deoband Meet | 
Bareilly News - Times of  India." The Times of  India. https://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bareilly/Panel-of-muftis-to-probe-charges-against-
Tauqeer-Raza-after-Deoband-meet/articleshow/52273236.cms. 
Tnn. "Police Accused of  Indifference | Ahmedabad News - Times of  India." The Times of  
India. May 11, 2019. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/Police-
accused-of-indifference/articleshow/2402171.cms. 
Tschalaer, Mengia Hong. Muslim Womens Quest for Justice: Gender, Law and Activism in 
India. Cambridge University Press, 2017.  
Tschalaer, Mengia Hong. "Muslim Women’s Rights Activists’ Visibility: Stretching the 
Gendered Boundaries of  the Public Space in the City of  Lucknow." South Asia 
Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, no. 11 (2015). doi:10.4000/samaj.3928. 
“Uniform Civil Code Unacceptable to the Muslim Community Muslims Are Bound to Follo
w Sharia in Their Religious Matters.”All India Muslim Personal Law Board, October 
13,  2016.  
"यूपी: तीन तलाक पीिड़ता िनदा खान के िपता पढ़न ेगए थे जुमे की नमाज, मिस्जद से बाहर िनकाला." Https://
www.livehindustan.com. September 07, 2018. https://www.livehindustan.com/uttar-
pradesh/story-father-of-teen-talaq-victim-nida-khan-throw-out-from-mosque-in-
bareilly-uttar-pradesh-2162449.html. 
!79
About the Author 
Danielle Ayana D’Aguilar grew up in both Wilmington, Delaware and Houston, Texas. She 
enrolled in the University of  Texas in 2014 to triple major in Hindi and Urdu, Islamic 
Studies and Plan II Honors with a minor in French. She attributes her decision to study 
South Asian languages to her interest in her own family heritage as well has her love and 
appreciation for South Asian food and culture. During three of  her five years at UT she 
competed nationally with the Bollywood-Fusion Dance team, UT Saaya, spent a total of  one 
year in India, and made headlines for her commitment to and passion for combatting racism 
and discrimination in powerful institutions.
!80
